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ESSAY
RECOGNIZING RACE
Justin Driver*
Judges habitually decide whether to identify individuals racially within
the context of judicial opinions. Yet this practice, which this Essay labels
“recognizing race,” has thus far gone virtually unexplored by legal scholars.
The dearth of scholarly attention to this practice is lamentable, as judges
often appear to make poor decisions in this arena—not only recognizing race
when they should avoid doing so, but failing to recognize race when they
should. This Essay represents the first sustained effort to offer a broad examination of the judiciary’s racial recognition in an attempt to articulate
broadly applicable normative principles. After observing that the number of
cases requiring judges to recognize race is dramatically smaller than is commonly appreciated, this Essay identifies and critiques two common pitfalls
that judges should seek to avoid: asymmetric racial recognition and gratuitous racial recognition. The Essay then provides four reforms regarding how
judges might affirmatively harness the potential of racial recognition. First,
judges should explain in writing why opinions recognize race. Second, judges
should contemplate how racial equality may be served by “unrecognizing”
race, even if a particular legal question contains a racial element. Third,
courts should practice racial inversion, a technique that assists judges in
thinking through precisely what work—if any—racial considerations play in
a particular case. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, judicial decisionmakers should bear in mind that opinions can adhere to the anticlassification principle while avoiding the colorblindness principle—two distinct
concepts that legal scholars have incorrectly conflated. By defamiliarizing racial recognition, this Essay aims to make the legal community more conscious
of its often confounding race-consciousness.
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INTRODUCTION
Few legal disputes have garnered more attention in recent years than
Ricci v. DeStefano.1 Even before the Supreme Court heard oral argument,
the New York Times featured the case and lead plaintiff Frank Ricci on its
front page.2 The potential for a landmark decision coupled with the
messy underlying facts—involving firefighters who claimed that New
Haven, Connecticut racially discriminated by refusing to certify examination results that would have promoted only nonblack firefighters—made
Ricci a natural candidate for widespread coverage. The media focus only
intensified after President Obama nominated a member of the Second
Circuit panel that resolved Ricci, then-Judge Sotomayor, to replace Justice
Souter on the Court.3 Although Justice Kennedy’s 5-4 decision ultimately
declined to tackle the broad question of whether Title VII and the Equal
Protection Clause could be reconciled,4 his relatively narrow decision vindicating the firefighters’ claim hardly signaled the end of Ricci’s moment
in the spotlight. Indeed, both Ricci and Ricci played starring roles in
Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings.5 Even weeks after the Court’s decision, moreover, prominent media outlets continued to run critiques of
1. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
2. Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear White Firefighters’ Bias Claims, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10,
2009, at A1.
3. See David D. Kirkpatrick, A Judge’s Focus on Race Issues May Be Hurdle, N.Y.
Times, May 30, 2009, at A1 (reporting one judicial observer’s opinion that “‘[Sotomayor’s]
nomination and the Ricci case have brought racial quotas back as a national issue’”
(quoting Gary Marx, Executive Director, Judicial Confirmation Network)).
4. For a prescient article exploring the potential tension between equal protection
and Title VII’s disparate impact doctrine, see Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and
Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 493, 498 (2003).
5. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
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Ricci.6 Legal scholarship—as is its wont—arrived late to the party. But
what it lacked in promptness it has more than compensated for in volume.7 Despite the torrent of journalistic and academic work parsing the
decision, perhaps Ricci’s most notable—and certainly its most jarring—
line has thus far utterly escaped analysis. That line appeared when Justice
Kennedy described one of the many meetings held by the New Haven
Civil Service Board (CSB) to consider whether to certify the firefighter
examination results.8 At that meeting, the CSB heard three witnesses testify about standardized testing and New Haven’s method for determining
promotions.9 Ricci identified two of the three witnesses by citing only
their relevant professional credentials. “The first witness, Christopher
Hornick, spoke to the CSB by telephone,” Justice Kennedy wrote.10
“Hornick is an industrial/organizational psychologist from Texas who operates a consulting business that ‘direct[ly]’ competes with” the company
that designed New Haven’s test.11 Similarly, Justice Kennedy explained:
“The final witness was Janet Helms, a professor at Boston College whose
‘primary area of expertise’ is ‘not with firefighters per se’ but in ‘race and
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 73–78, 91–95, 414–19 (2009) (questioning of Judge
Sotomayor by various Senators regarding Ricci); id. at 488–89 (statement of Frank Ricci).
6. See, e.g., Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, Trial by Firefighters, N.Y. Times, July 11,
2009, at A19 (suggesting Ricci signals need for “a clear-eyed reassessment of our blind faith
in entrenched testing regimes”); Shelby Steele, Affirmative Action Is Just a Distraction,
Wash. Post, July 26, 2009, at B4 (contending Ricci demonstrates “irrationality of disparate
impact”).
7. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Is Integration a Discriminatory Purpose?, 96 Iowa L. Rev.
837, 842–43 (2011) (contending Ricci prohibits government from inflicting racial harm
but does not necessarily prevent it from pursuing integration); Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly
West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L.
Rev. 73, 73 (2010) (suggesting Ricci does not evaluate all claims of discrimination on equal
grounds but rather “whitens” discrimination and “races” test fairness); Helen Norton, The
Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 197, 229 (2010) (“The Court now, however, appears to treat a decision
maker’s attention to the disparities experienced by members of traditionally subordinated
racial groups—that is, its antisubordination ends—as inextricable from an intent to
discriminate against others, and thus sufficiently suspicious to demand justification.”);
Richard A. Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1341, 1344 (2010)
(describing three ways to read Ricci and arguing Court’s ruling treats disparate impact as
inherently race-conscious theory that is susceptible to challenge under Equal Protection
Clause); Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New Disparate
Impact?, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 2181, 2181–82 (2010) (suggesting Ricci can be read to create new
affirmative defense for employers facing claims of disparate impact); Girardeau A. Spann,
Disparate Impact, 98 Geo. L.J. 1133, 1135 (2010) (noting Ricci “appears to have
commenced a campaign to eviscerate the racially disparate impact cause of action that was
created by the employment discrimination prohibition of Title VII”); Michael J. Zimmer,
Ricci’s “Color-Blind” Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case of Unintended
Consequences?, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1257, 1259 (arguing that Court established essentially
“color-blind” standard of disparate treatment liability for Title VII).
8. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2667–68 (2009).
9. Id. at 2668.
10. Id.
11. Id. (quoting joint appendix).
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culture as they influence performance on tests and other assessment procedures.’”12 Justice Kennedy’s description of the second witness also
started with professional qualifications. “The second witness was Vincent
Lewis, a fire program specialist for the Department of Homeland Security
and a retired fire captain from Michigan,” Justice Kennedy began.13 But
from that innocuous beginning, Justice Kennedy deviated sharply, introducing a conspicuous factor that he omitted from the other descriptions:
“Lewis, who is black, had looked ‘extensively’ at the lieutenant exam and ‘a
little less extensively’ at the captain exam.”14
This identification is striking because, in a decision that cautions
against the dangers of racially disparate treatment, it treats Lewis disparately by race. Ricci’s disclosure that Lewis is black suggests that his race
carries unusual significance, and that it is germane to the case in a way
that the other two witnesses’ racial identities are not. Were it otherwise,
Ricci presumably would have approached the three witnesses’ racial identities in the same fashion—either revealing them all or concealing them
all. Ricci’s racial identification of Lewis is all the more arresting because it
comes from the pen of Justice Kennedy, who has long insisted that the
government should resist racially classifying individuals.15
What message, then, does the Court attempt to communicate by
mentioning Lewis’s race? It is impossible to answer that question with
certainty because Ricci, like most cases that identify the race of individuals, offers no explanation for its racial approach. The most compelling
interpretation, however, understands Lewis’s blackness to support the notion that New Haven’s exam was nondiscriminatory. Of the three witnesses, it bears emphasizing, Lewis endorsed the test with the greatest
force. While Hornick and Helms both noted that heavily weighting written tests typically results in racial minorities receiving disproportionately
fewer promotions, Lewis praised the exam’s legitimacy.16 “He stated that
the candidates ‘should know that material,’” Justice Kennedy wrote.17 “In
Lewis’s view, the ‘questions were relevant for both exams,’ and the New
Haven candidates had an advantage because the study materials identified the particular book chapters from which the questions were taken. In
other departments, by contrast, ‘you had to know basically the . . . entire
book.’”18 That an expert who is black gave the test a passing mark, Justice
12. Id. at 2669 (quoting joint appendix).
13. Id.
14. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting joint appendix).
15. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (Kenndy, J.) (“One of the
principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity
and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and
essential qualities.”).
16. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2668–69 (discussing Lewis’s belief that test was relevant).
17. Id. at 2669 (quoting joint appendix).
18. Id. (quoting joint appendix).
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Kennedy seemed to suggest, should alleviate concern about the exam’s
racially disparate impact.19
Support for this understanding may be located in the petitioners’
Supreme Court brief filed on behalf of Frank Ricci and his fellow
firefighters. That brief, it strongly appears, inspired the Court’s racial
(and nonracial) descriptions of the three witnesses. After noting that
“Vincent Lewis [was] a highly credentialed expert in fire and homeland
security services,” the brief made the following observation in a construction that anticipated the Court’s: “Lewis, who is African-American,
thought well of the exams and believed they measured the [knowledge,
skills, and abilities that promoted firefighters] must possess.”20 Like the
Court’s opinion in Ricci, the brief also declined to identify Hornick and
Helms by race. Given that whiteness is often naturalized,21 it seems plausible that the Court’s racial silence regarding Hornick and Helms indicates
that both are white. Intriguingly, though, this is not the case. Although
Hornick does in fact identify as white, Helms identifies herself as black.22
Thus, Justice Kennedy’s opinion—perhaps unwittingly—highlighted an
expert’s blackness who supported the examination, but rendered raceless
a black expert who cast doubt on it.
Justice Kennedy’s unsettled and unsettling approach to identifying
witnesses at a New Haven meeting—an approach embodied by a simple
adjectival phrase that amounts to a grand total of three words (“who is
black”)—provides an occasion to step back and cast a critical eye over the
judiciary’s mottled practice of racial recognition. Judicial recognitions of
race have thus far generally been viewed as preordained. Indeed, it is
tempting to believe that courts simply recognize race whenever doing so
is pertinent and avoid recognizing race whenever doing so is not pertinent. It quickly becomes apparent, however, that these categories are far
from self-sorting. Judges often make seemingly small decisions about
whose race to recognize within their larger judicial decisions.23 But it
19. After racially describing Lewis initially in the facts section, the Court returned to
Lewis in the analysis and elevated his testimony. See id. at 2678 (“Of the outside witnesses
who appeared before the CSB, only one, Vincent Lewis, had reviewed the examinations in
any detail, and he was the only one with any firefighting experience. Lewis stated that the
‘questions were relevant for both exams.’” (quoting joint appendix)).
20. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 13, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328),
2009 WL 453242.
21. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707, 1775 (1993)
(arguing colorblindness “ratifies existing white privilege by making it the referential base
line”).
22. E-mail from Janet Helms, Professor, Bos. Coll., to author (Feb. 18, 2011, 1:47 PM)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); E-mail from Christopher Hornick, President, CWH
Research, Inc., to author (Feb. 20, 2011, 10:50 AM) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
23. At least one distinguished scholar has suggested that race enters the legal
equation in only a narrow band of cases. See Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to
Be Black, 97 Yale L.J. 420, 439 (1988) (“The law in its majestic neutrality takes no official
note of the race of the victim unless the victim places race in issue, as for example in a
claim of racial discrimination.”). The history of racial recognition, however, contradicts
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would be deeply mistaken to dismiss these race-based decisions as trivial.
Rather, examining the manner in which judges recognize race elucidates
how courts (and the broader legal culture of which they are part) both
assess and simultaneously create racial significance.24
This Essay represents the first sustained effort to offer a broad examination of the judiciary’s racial recognition in an attempt to articulate
broadly applicable normative principles for when and how courts should
recognize race. Thus far, legal scholars have not subjected the judiciary’s
racial recognition to much in the way of scrutiny. The paucity of scholarly
attention to this common practice is disconcerting not least because
judges often appear to make poor decisions regarding racial recognition:
Courts not only recognize race when they should avoid doing so, but
courts also fail to recognize race when they should. The few scholars who
have addressed racial recognition, moreover, have done so only within
the narrow confines of a discrete doctrinal area.25 Perhaps in part because of their constrained doctrinal examinations, previous scholarly inquiries of this phenomenon have typically asserted that courts pay what
many scholars regard as insufficient attention to race.26 More racial justice, these scholars urge, requires more judicial recognition of race.
this assessment, as courts have repeatedly recognized race in contexts where race appears
to be either tangential or irrelevant to the underlying legal issue. See infra text
accompanying notes 68–71 (discussing judges’ superfluous recognition of race).
24. Cf. Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8 (2003) (arguing that
“constitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical relationship, so that
constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture”).
25. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Teaching Laws with Flaws: Adopting a Pluralistic
Approach to Torts, 57 Mo. L. Rev. 443, 446–47 (1992) (examining racial recognition in
area of torts); Richard R.W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 2023, 2025–26
(2006) (corporations); Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich.
L. Rev. 946, 967–68 (2002) (Fourth Amendment); Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue
Encounters”—Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should
Race Matter?, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 243, 265 (1991) [hereinafter Maclin, Black and Blue]
(noting that Supreme Court never mentioned race of black shooting victim in Fourth
Amendment case of Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)); Tracey Maclin, Race and the
Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 340–41 (1998) [hereinafter Maclin, Race]
(examining racial recognition in context of Fourth Amendment). At least one scholar has
focused on the related, but conceptually distinct, notion of how lawyers, as opposed to
judges, should deploy race in a particular doctrinal context. See Naomi R. Cahn,
Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 965, 999
(1997) (arguing in context of attorneys representing welfare recipients that “lawyers must
struggle with whether, when, and how to mention race”).
26. See Carbado, supra note 25, at 968–69 (contending Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is insufficiently sensitive to race of criminal suspects and
defendants); Maclin, Black and Blue, supra note 25, at 265 (“Whatever the motivation,
ignoring the impact of race does a disservice to blacks and the country as a whole. The
problem of race-based excessive force by the police will not go away simply because the
Court sticks its collective head in the sand.”); Maclin, Race, supra note 25, at 340
(“Although the casual reader of the Court’s Fourth Amendment opinions would never
know it, race matters when measuring the dynamics and legitimacy of certain police-citizen
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This Essay departs from that tradition by insisting that, when it
comes to recognizing race, less is sometimes more. Courts should, in
other words, sometimes contemplate omitting race from opinions rather
than injecting it. But writing about race, for whatever reason, often leads
to scholarship that tends toward absolutes. This Essay attempts to carve
out a middle path, where always and never are replaced by often and sometimes. Against scholars writing in the critical race theory tradition,27 this
Essay insists that the path to racial equality often requires judges to avoid
recognizing race. Against advocates of a purely colorblind approach,28
this Essay insists that the path to racial equality sometimes requires racial
recognition.
The balance of this Essay evaluates the descriptive and prescriptive
aspects of how judges recognize race. Part I canvases the judicial practice
encounters.” (citation omitted)); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in
Context: The Continuing Significance of Racism, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 325, 328 (1992)
[hereinafter Aleinikoff, Context] (“[T]he persistence and power of racism ought to be
seen as an important part of the social ‘context’ with which constitutional norms regarding
equal protection and racial justice interact.”); Regina Austin, “Bad for Business”:
Contextual Analysis, Race Discrimination, and Fast Food, 34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 207, 207
(2000) (“If race truly mattered, legal argument, writing, and scholarship would pay much
more attention to context than it does today.”). Professor Brooks does not, admittedly,
encourage courts to increase their racial recognition of corporations. See Brooks, supra
note 25, at 2092 (“The courts’ recognition of the presence or absence of race in
corporations should be avoided . . . .”). But his analysis elevates the bar for permitting
courts to recognize race to an exceedingly high level. See id. (arguing “[l]egal judgments
about race should recognize race as minimally as possible”).
27. See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 25, at 970 (advocating without qualification for
interpretation of Fourth Amendment that would be “explicitly race-conscious”). Beyond
the racial recognition context, critical race theory often traffics in absolutism. See Derrick
Bell, Racial Realism, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 363, 373 (1992) (“Black people will never gain full
equality in this country.”); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roadmap: Is the Marketplace
Theory for Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley?, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 215, 243 (1998)
(arguing “race will always remain a separate and independent subordinating factor”).
28. See Lino A. Graglia, Special Admission of the “Culturally Deprived” to Law
School, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 351, 354 (1970) (contending that “the democratic ideal”
requires “people not be classified—and neither taught nor expected to classify others—on
the grounds of race”); see also William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme
Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 790 (1979) (“The state may neither
use race in its own business nor may it encourage others to take it into account. Both are
equally divisive and equally wrong.”). Colorblindness also has adherents in high places.
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“My view of the Constitution is Justice Harlan’s view in Plessy:
‘Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’”
(quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). Some
scholars who appear sympathetic to the colorblindness ideal realize that forbidding the
government from ever taking account of race is not only unworkable, but would also be
unwise. See Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104
Harv. L. Rev. 107, 111 (1990) (“It is impossible to ignore racial differences entirely—pure
color-blindness is too extreme a principle.”); id. at 111 n.19 (“If a disease . . .
overwhelmingly afflicts a particular ethnic group, it would be unreasonable to ignore that
fact. If a criminal gang has an exclusive racial composition, it would be fanatical to require
the government to ignore this fact in recruiting agents to infiltrate that gang.”).
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of racial recognition in order to make two primary points. First, the number of cases doctrinally requiring judges to recognize race is dramatically
smaller than is commonly appreciated. Second, when courts recognize
race for a discernible reason, they have tended to do so either to highlight a broad need for judicial intervention or to demonstrate that judicial intervention is unnecessary. Placing the courts’ historical practices
and varied purposes squarely in view sets the parameters of the debate,
thus permitting assessment of the warrants for racial recognition.
With that analytical foundation established, the Essay examines the
normative considerations involved when courts recognize race. Part II
identifies and critiques two types of racial recognition that judges should
attempt to avoid when they write opinions. The first pitfall—racial asymmetry—occurs when a judicial opinion acknowledges the race of some
actors, but not the race of similarly situated actors. Judges should not
limit their focus to avoiding racial asymmetries within the confines of a
particular opinion; rather, judges should attempt to develop a generally
symmetrical approach across doctrinal areas. The second pitfall—gratuitous disclosures of race—arises when judges reveal race for no apparent
reason. Courts should be particularly leery of such racial gratuitousness in
cases that have the potential to confirm damaging stereotypes.
After analyzing how judges should not recognize race, Part III shifts
the focus to exploring how judges might affirmatively harness the potential of racial recognition. The first step in that process involves judges
acknowledging the choice associated with racial recognition by offering
an explanation of why, precisely, the opinion identifies someone by race.
In addition, judges should contemplate whether justice may be more
readily achieved when race is “unrecognized”—even if there is a racial
component to the legal issue at hand. Relatedly, courts should utilize the
technique of “racial inversion,” which assists judges in thinking through
precisely what work, if any, racial considerations are playing in cases by
inverting the races of the key players. Finally, judges should bear in mind
that, contrary to the conventional wisdom among legal scholars, the
anticlassification principle is conceptually distinct from the colorblindness principle. Because these two concepts are not coextensive, judges
may take account of racial realities that exist in society without racially
identifying particular individuals. Given the current Justices’ views regarding race, this strategic insight could prove vitally important for legal advocates who wish to have the Supreme Court recognize the continuing role
that race plays in society.
The thread unifying these three Parts is the aim of making the legal
community—lawyers and judges, students and scholars—more conscious
of judicial race-consciousness. Although this Essay aims to identify some
previously underappreciated common ground, not everyone will agree
with every recommendation regarding when courts should recognize race
and when they should refrain from doing so. But this Essay does not seek
universal agreement. Instead, it seeks to generate a nuanced discussion of
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racial recognition in our legal culture—a discussion that has thus far
been sorely lacking in this essential arena.
I. PRACTICES
A. When
In certain cases, courts possess virtually no discretion regarding
whether to recognize a particular person’s racial identity. This set of cases
involving required racial determinations, however, accounts for an infinitesimal percentage of the standard judicial practices of recognizing race.
Because judges must recognize race in a very limited number of cases
(and many of those cases stretch back to a much earlier era), this means
that in the overwhelming number of instances judges make an elective
choice to recognize race. Legitimate prudential reasons may well motivate the decision to identify individuals by race. Judges delude themselves, however, if they believe that they generally exercise no choice regarding whether to recognize race. Indeed, even in cases that seem to cry
out for racial recognition—cases that involve, say, claims of racial discrimination—it is typically possible to avoid racially designating individuals,
even if it would be unwise to do so. Exploring the considerable discretion
that judges confront exposes the wrongheaded notion that judges discuss
race only when they must.
1. Required? — Historically, a prominent type of case that virtually
mandates that courts recognize race has arisen when parties disagree
about whether a race-specific statute either includes or excludes a particular individual.29 During the 1920s, for example, the Supreme Court decided a pair of immigration cases that turned on whether two individuals
could become naturalized U.S. citizens under a provision that applied in
relevant part only to “white persons.”30 In Ozawa v. United States, Takao
Ozawa, a Japanese man, claimed that he should be permitted to naturalize because he was a “white person.”31 The Court, however, disagreed and
deemed Ozawa a nonwhite person and therefore ineligible to naturalize.32 Rather than focusing on skin color, the Court found that the term
“white person” could be understood roughly as amounting to “a person
of the Caucasian race.”33 One significant feature of Ozawa’s test was that
it articulated what might be dubbed a common law approach to race. The
Court in Ozawa did not “establish a sharp line of demarcation” for natu29. For a thorough historical examination of cases where courts resolved contested
issues of racial identity, see Ariela J. Gross, What Blood Won’t Tell: A History of Race on
Trial in America 14 (2008) (exploring why “legal institutions invested so much time and
effort in determining racial boundaries”).
30. Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 316, 318 (amending Act of July 14, 1870, ch.
254, 16 Stat. 254, 256).
31. 260 U.S. 178, 194–95 (1922).
32. Id. at 198 (determining “appellant . . . is not Caucasian and therefore belongs
entirely outside the zone on the negative side”).
33. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ralization, “but rather a zone of more or less debatable ground outside of
which . . . are those clearly eligible, and outside of which . . . are those
clearly ineligible for citizenship.”34 The Court continued: “Individual
cases falling within this zone must be determined as they arise from time
to time by what this Court has called, in another connection . . . ‘the
gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.’”35 There may well be
hard racial cases, but Ozawa’s was not among them. “The appellant . . . is
clearly of a race which is not Caucasian and therefore belongs entirely
outside the zone on the negative side,” the Court concluded.36
Just three months after deciding Ozawa, the Court availed itself of
the common law approach to race when it weighed whether Bhagat
Singh Thind, “a high caste Hindu of full Indian blood, born at Amrit Sar,
Punjab, India,” qualified as a “white person” for purposes of the naturalization statute.37 In United States v. Thind, the Court partially retreated
from equating whiteness with the Caucasian race: “What we now hold is
that the words ‘free white persons’ are words of common speech, to be
interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common man,
synonymous with the word ‘Caucasian’ only as that word is popularly understood.”38 And Thind, the Court reasoned, was popularly understood
to be a nonwhite person.39
As should by now be evident, it would have been extremely difficult
for the Court to avoid recognizing race in either Ozawa or Thind. Both
cases boiled down to the fundamental question of whether the men qualified as “white.” But even when recognizing race seems mandatory, the
Court has sometimes managed to resist the mandate.
Another pair of Supreme Court cases, decided exactly one hundred
years apart, vividly demonstrate this significant discretionary element. In
United States v. Perryman, the Court in 1879 was charged with resolving the
seemingly straightforward question of whether “a negro” was in fact “a
white person.”40 Although the Court ultimately answered in the negative,
Perryman’s delicate statutory context imbued the question with substantially greater difficulty than this unadorned setup suggests. The events
giving rise to the case occurred in December 1874, when “Henry Carter, a
negro, and not an Indian,” stole twenty-three head of cattle “from the
claimant, a friendly Creek Indian.”41 Carter was convicted and sentenced
to pay the claimant twice the value of the stolen cattle.42 Because Carter
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877)).
36. Id.
37. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 206 (1923) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
38. Id. at 214–15.
39. Id. at 215 (noting racial differences in appearance would be apparent, even in
subsequent generations).
40. 100 U.S. 235, 236 (1879).
41. Id at 235–36.
42. Id.
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lacked the money to satisfy the judgment, however, the claimant filed a
lawsuit seeking to recover directly from the United States.43 Availing himself of provisions from the Nonintercourse Act of 1834, the claimant—a
“friendly Indian” whose property had been stolen “within the Indian
country” by a non-Indian, who was “unable to pay a sum”—contended
that “whatever such payment . . . [fell] short . . . [should] be paid out of
the treasury of the United States.”44 The United States contested neither
the claimant’s friendliness nor his Indianness. But the government nevertheless insisted that it should not be held liable for Carter’s theft because
the statute applied to acts committed only by a “white person,” a term of
art with a meaning distinct from “not an Indian.”45
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Waite, endorsed this rationale, concluding that the claimant could not recover because Carter was
black.46 “The term ‘white person,’ in the Revised Statutes, must be given
the same meaning it had in the original act of 1834,” wrote Chief Justice
Waite.47 The Civil War and the ensuing Reconstruction Amendments had
elevated blacks to citizenship, Chief Justice Waite allowed. But those subsequent events did nothing to alter the terms of the relevant statute:
While the negro, under the operation of the constitutional
amendments, has been endowed with certain civil and political
rights which he did not have in 1834, he is no more, in fact, a
white person now than he was then. He is a citizen of the United
States, and free. No State can abridge his privileges and immunities as a citizen, or deny him the equal protection of the laws;
but his race and color are the same, and he is no more included
now within the descriptive term of a white person, than he always has been.48
Comparing the statutory language at issue with earlier statutes, Chief
Justice Waite suggested that Congress in the 1830s had deliberately invoked the term “white person.”49 By substituting “white person” for the
broader terminology that had previously been used (“any citizen or other
person residing within the United States”) in this particular statute,
Perryman reasoned: “[W]e cannot but think that Congress meant just
what the language used conveys to the popular mind.”50 Offering a brief
history lesson, Chief Justice Waite contended that the United States
would have had good reason to avail itself of race-specific language inten43. Id. The statute provided in relevant part: “[I]f such offender shall be unable to
pay a sum at least equal to the just value or amount, whatever such payment shall fall short
of the same shall be paid out of the treasury of the United States.” Nonintercourse Act of
1834, ch. 161, § 16, 4 Stat. 729, 731 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1160 (2006)).
44. Nonintercourse Act of 1834, § 16, 4 Stat. at 731.
45. Perryman, 100 U.S. at 237.
46. Id. at 236, 238.
47. Id. at 236.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 237–38.
50. Id. at 238.
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tionally. “The Cherokee nation, which had given the State of Georgia so
much trouble, was about to remove to its new home west of the
Mississippi,” Waite noted quaintly.51 “It was . . . thought if the United
States made themselves liable only for . . . depredations . . . committed by
the whites, these and other Indians would be less likely to tolerate fugitive
blacks in their country. Hence, as a means of preventing the escape of
slaves, the change in the law was made.”52 Slavery had been extinguished,
Chief Justice Waite conceded, but the statutory language endured: “As
the right is statutory, the claimant cannot recover unless he brings himself within the terms of the statute. That he has not done.”53 Thus, in
Perryman the statutory regime seemed to require the Court to render a
racial determination—in so doing, it took care to recognize Carter as a
black person, which is to say, not a white person.
In 1979, one century after deciding Perryman, the Court took a decidedly different path regarding racial recognition when faced with an extremely similar race-specific provision in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe.54
Wilson involved a dispute over a tract of land between Omaha Indians, on
one side, and several entities (nine individuals, two corporations, and the
State of Iowa), on the other side.55 The statute in question, which also
stemmed from the Nonintercourse Act, provided that in trials regarding
property “in which an Indian may be a party on one side, and a white
person on the other, the burden of proof shall rest upon the white person, whenever the Indian shall make out a presumption of title in himself
from the fact of previous possession or ownership.”56 Wilson concluded
that “white person” applied to the two corporations,57 but did not apply
to Iowa because a sovereign state is not a person.58 The Court refused,
however, to determine expressly whether the nine individuals were
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
55. Id. at 679 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
56. 25 U.S.C. § 194 (1976).
57. Wilson, 442 U.S. at 666–67. (“The word ‘person’ . . . is normally construed to
include ‘corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint
stock companies, as well as individuals.’” (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976))). The Court simply
ignored the racial modifier, and instead noted that corporations were persons within the
statute’s meaning. But Wilson’s conclusion that the provision applied to the two
corporations may caution somewhat against Professor Brooks’s broad claim that the
Supreme Court has uniformly denied that corporations possess racial identity. See Brooks,
supra note 25, at 2073 (“The U.S. Supreme Court has only twice addressed the possibility
of corporate racial identity, denying it in both instances.”). Professor Brooks’s generally
illuminating and thorough article, however, does not mention Wilson. In the context of 25
U.S.C. § 194, at least, the Court seems to have concluded that all non-Indian corporations
are “white.” See Wilson, 442 U.S. at 667 & n.17 (“It stands to reason that . . . Congress was
fully aware that [the provision] would be interpreted to cover artificial entities as well as
individuals.”).
58. Wilson, 442 U.S. at 667 (“‘[I]n common usage, the term “person” does not
include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to
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“white,” even though it found that they were covered by the terms of the
statute.59 Instead, Wilson sidestepped Perryman’s racial recognition with
reasoning that bordered on ipse dixit,60 then simply asserted that
“[w]hether Perryman would be followed today is a question we need not
decide.”61
The Court declined to recognize the race of individuals in Wilson,
even though Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion suggesting
that they were required to do so.62 Given that no evidence existed in the
record regarding the individuals’ race and that the burden for proving
the statute’s factual predicate rested with the tribe, Justice Blackmun reasoned that the Court could not simply assume that the individuals were
Caucasian.63 Instead, Justice Blackmun emphasized, the Court must have
assumed that “white person” within the statute “refers, not to a Caucasian,
but to a ‘non-Indian’ individual. On this assumption, the race of the individual petitioners (so long as they are not Indians) would be irrelevant in
determining [the statute’s] applicability.”64 Justice Blackmun noted that
this assumption placed Wilson in sharp tension with Perryman. In his view,
that tension meant that Perryman should be jettisoned, because construing the statute “as applicable to disputes between Indians and Caucasians,
but not to disputes between Indians and black or oriental individuals,
would create an irrational racial classification highly questionable under
the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.”65 Of course, the majority disagreed—demonstrating that the Court can render seemingly
mandatory racial recognition optional if it so desires.
2. Choice. — As the Perryman-Wilson split exquisitely highlights, it is
important to understand that today’s courts are typically not required to
recognize the race of particular individuals. Cases involving racially specific statutes are overwhelmingly a thing of the past. Immigration law, for
instance, has long since abandoned racial limitations upon naturaliza-

exclude it.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600,
604 (1941))).
59. Id. at 669 (“[Section] 194 contemplates the non-Indian’s shouldering the burden
of persuasion.”).
60. Id. at 666 n.16 (rejecting comparison to Perryman because that “case dealt with
another provision of the 1834 Nonintercourse Act, § 16, and there were distinct grounds in
the legislative history indicating that the term ‘white person’ as used in § 16 did not
include a Negro”).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 679–80 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing majority must make explicit
which assumption it is using to apply § 194 to private petitioners).
63. Id. at 680.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 680–81.
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tion.66 Decisions involving the 1834 Nonintercourse Act’s race-specific
language have never been legion.67
When judges recognize race in judicial decisions today, it is usually
because they have chosen to do so.68 That statement applies even to cases
regarding claims of racial discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause or Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. It has been clear since at least Strauder v. West Virginia that the
Fourteenth Amendment provides protection to people of all different
races—including whites.69 Similarly, there has been no question since
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s opinion in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. in 1976 that Title VII protects whites and nonwhites alike.70
Thus, rather than disclosing that, say, a black person has filed a lawsuit
alleging racial discrimination against his white employer, a court could instead elect to note that an employee has filed a racial discrimination suit
against his employer, who is of a different race.71
This construction of a racial discrimination claim—a construction
that seeks to avoid racial recognition—is not as fanciful as one might initially suspect. Five years ago, the Court issued a per curiam opinion in Los
Angeles County v. Rettele that began in a manner that seemed designed to
resist racial recognition. The Court’s opinion opened: “Deputies of the
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department obtained a valid warrant to
search a house, but they were unaware that the suspects being sought had
moved out three months earlier. When the deputies searched the house,
they found in a bedroom two residents who were of a different race than the
suspects.”72 After observing that the couple’s race did not match the suspects’ race on the warrant, the police nevertheless ordered the couple
out of bed.73 Complying with this order proved embarrassing because the
couple had been sleeping in the nude.74 The couple filed a lawsuit claim66. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration
Law, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 809, 817 (2007) (noting racial restrictions on naturalization were not
eliminated until after World War II).
67. See, e.g., Wilson, 442 U.S. at 658 (describing 25 U.S.C. § 194 (1976) as “a 145-yearold, but seldom used, statute”).
68. Appellate courts do not, of course, have an unlimited ability to recognize race.
The record typically reflects the race of a party or other individual before appellate courts
opt to do so.
69. 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (arguing that prohibition on entire race serving on
juries would be unconstitutional if applied to whites).
70. 427 U.S. 273, 286–87 (1976).
71. I do not suggest, of course, that people cannot racially discriminate against
members of their own race, nor do I suggest that such treatment is beyond law’s reach. For
an exploration of these issues, see generally Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin
Color, 49 Duke L.J. 1487 (2000) (discussing discrimination based on color as opposed to
race and describing law’s role in countering such discrimination).
72. Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 609–10 (2007) (per curiam)
(emphasis added).
73. Id. at 610.
74. Id.
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ing that the order violated their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.75 Rettele then summarized the holdings below, seeming to take care to avoid racial recognition:
The District Court granted summary judgment to all named defendants. The Court of Appeals . . . conclud[ed] both that the
deputies violated the Fourth Amendment and that they were
not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable deputy
would have stopped the search upon discovering that respondents were of a different race than the suspects and because a reasonable deputy would not have ordered respondents from their
bed.76
This factual recitation appears deliberately crafted to avoid recognizing race. It would have been more straightforward for the Court to communicate Rettele’s essential facts roughly as follows: Though police officers
obtained a valid warrant to search a house that they believed to be occupied by black residents, the officers encountered white occupants when
they conducted the search. Rettele itself ultimately retreated to the more
familiar terrain of racial recognition.77 It is important to realize, however,
both that it was not required to do so and that other terrain existed.
Avoiding racial recognition may well have much to recommend
against it. As Rettele’s opening illustrates, avoiding racial recognition can
quickly grow cumbersome. The practice would grow more cumbersome
still if a legal dispute involved individuals from several different races,
rather than only two races, as was the case in Rettele. Many judges, moreover, could plausibly conclude that knowing the relevant races in Rettele
paints a vibrant racial picture, and that the public should know that it was
white people—not racial minorities—who claimed that the officers violated their rights.78 But these are prudential reasons for recognizing particular racial identities, not reasons that mandate racial recognition. To75. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. See, e.g., id. at 611 (“All three . . . are Caucasians.”).
78. Some observers, for instance, might view the claim in Rettele as being predicated
upon a perceived entitlement to avoid unwanted encounters with the police. The Supreme
Court, for its part, was unimpressed by the court of appeals’ conclusion that “‘[a]fter
taking one look at [respondents], the deputies should have realized that [respondents]
were not the subjects of the search warrant and did not pose a threat to the deputies’
safety.’” Id. at 613 (alterations in original) (quoting Rettele v. Los Angeles County, 186 F.
App’x 765, 766 (9th Cir. 2006)). In a remarkable passage striking a blow for racial equality,
the Court retorted:
We need not pause long in rejecting this unsound proposition. When the
deputies ordered respondents from their bed, they had no way of knowing
whether the African-American suspects were elsewhere in the house. The
presence of some Caucasians in the residence did not eliminate the possibility
that the suspects lived there as well. As the deputies stated in their affidavits, it is
not uncommon in our society for people of different races to live together. Just as
people of different races live and work together, so too might they engage in joint
criminal activity.
Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-2\COL205.txt

2012]

unknown

RECOGNIZING RACE

Seq: 16

24-FEB-12

9:25

419

day, judges almost invariably choose when to recognize race rather than
having that decision imposed upon them. The question becomes, then,
whether judges are exercising their racial choices wisely.
B. Why
This section explores why courts decide to recognize race in instances when doing so is not, as a formal matter, required. What information, precisely, are judges communicating that would be missing from the
opinion if the racial recognition in question were omitted? Put simply:
What work does recognizing race perform? In many instances, the answer
to these questions is that racial recognition does precious little work, if
any at all. In an important subset of cases, though, racial recognition
seems to perform significant work. Dating back to the beginning of the
twentieth century, this subset of cases can be usefully divided into two
broad categories. First, the Court sometimes recognizes race to suggest
that racial considerations reveal the nature of a problem that demands
judicial intervention. In the second category, conversely, the Court sometimes recognizes race in order to suggest that racial considerations reveal
that no problem demanding judicial intervention exists. It should be
stated at the outset that this inquiry requires at least some speculation
because, as will be discussed and critiqued below,79 judges far too infrequently explain their racial invocations.
1. Problem. — The archetypal set of cases in which judges recognized
race to alert readers to a problem that demanded judicial intervention
arose in a series of criminal cases that emerged from the Jim Crow
South.80 It is surely not by happenstance that in Powell v. Alabama—the
first of the Scottsboro Boys cases to make its way to the Supreme Court—
Justice Sutherland addressed the highly-charged racial background in the
case’s opening sentence.81 “The petitioners,” Justice Sutherland began,
“hereinafter referred to as defendants, are negroes charged with the
crime of rape, committed upon the persons of two white girls.”82 To describe these facts as occurring in 1930s Alabama was to describe the need
for judicial intervention.83 In Brown v. Mississippi, a 1936 case involving a
forced confession, Chief Justice Hughes’s opinion for the Court took a
more subtle tack than the one adopted in Powell.84 But the opinion left
no doubt that the Court viewed itself as correcting a racial outrage.
79. See infra Part II.A (discussing asymmetrical invocation of race in opinions).
80. For an argument that racial considerations animated the Court’s intervention in
criminal procedure, see Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal
Procedure, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 48, 49 (2000).
81. 287 U.S. 45, 49 (1932) (identifying petitioners as black in opening sentence); see
also Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 601 (1935) (same); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587, 588 (1935) (same).
82. Powell, 287 U.S. at 49.
83. See generally James Goodman, Stories of Scottsboro (1995) (analyzing various
accounts of Scottsboro case and placing them in context of 1930s Alabama).
84. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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Rather than recognizing the criminal defendants’ race directly, Chief
Justice Hughes did so indirectly by quoting at length a dissenting opinion
from the Mississippi Supreme Court: “‘This deputy was put on the
stand . . . and admitted the whippings. It is interesting to note that in his
testimony . . . and in response to the inquiry as to how severely he was
whipped, the deputy stated, “Not too much for a negro . . . .”’”85 Highlighting the racial elements of these cases may have been designed to explain
why the Court was intervening in matters that would have at the time
traditionally fallen within the purview of state courts.86
The Court continued to recognize race in cases involving criminal
defendants who were racial minorities well beyond the 1930s.87 Indeed,
by the time that Chief Justice Earl Warren drafted Miranda v. Arizona in
1966,88 the quest for criminal justice was, in the minds of many, inextricably connected to the quest for racial justice.89 It is not especially surprising, then, that this connection appears within the Miranda opinion itself.
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion took pains to observe the race of the criminal defendants in two of the four consolidated cases that the Court considered in Miranda, intimating that being a racial minority could add to
the coercive nature of police interrogation.90 “In each of the [four] cases,
the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through
menacing police interrogation procedures,” Warren wrote.91 “The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent, for example, in Miranda,
where the indigent Mexican defendant was a seriously disturbed individual with pronounced sexual fantasies, and in Stewart, in which the defen-

85. Id. at 284 (emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 471 (Miss.
1935) (Griffith, J., dissenting)).
86. See Klarman, supra note 80, at 53 (describing Supreme Court’s expanded
interpretation of Due Process Clause in state criminal cases where it had previously been
narrowly construed).
87. See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 193 (1957) (“It is, of course, highly
material to the question before this Court to ascertain petitioner’s character and
background. He is a Negro, 27 years old in 1953, who started school at age eight and left at
16 while still in the third grade.”).
88. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
89. See Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010
Sup. Ct. Rev. 59, 85 (“Perhaps the clearest evidence of the gravitational pull of race on
Warren Court constitutional doctrine was in the areas of criminal law and procedure.”);
Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 673, 678 (1992) (“Both
supporters and opponents of Miranda understood that, in large measure, the crime
problem was the race problem . . . .”). For an argument contending that judicial concern
about police harassment of gay men may have also played a role in shaping modern
criminal procedure, see David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz,
Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 875,
896–931 (2008).
90. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
91. Id.
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dant was an indigent Los Angeles Negro who had dropped out of school
in the sixth grade.”92
Notably, racial considerations appear to have motivated Chief Justice
Warren’s decision in Miranda even more than the opinion’s final text
reveals. An early draft of the opinion underscored the often racialized
element of harsh interrogation techniques:
“In a series of cases decided by this Court long after these studies, Negro defendants were subjected to physical brutality—
beatings, hangings, whipping—employed to extort confessions.
In 1947, the President’s Committee on Civil Rights probed further into police violence upon minority groups. The files of the
Justice Department, in the words of the Committee, abounded
‘with evidence of illegal official action in southern states.’”93
Warren sent Justice Brennan the draft before circulating it to the entire
Court, and Brennan implored him to remove the above passage: “‘I wonder if it is appropriate in this context to turn police brutality into a racial
problem. If anything characterizes the group this opinion concerns it is
poverty more than race.’”94 Warren removed the offending passage from
the final text. The racial recognition of the parties in Miranda, of course,
remained.
In addition to recognizing the race of parties, the Court has also
racially recognized decisionmakers to signal that it believes all is not well
on the racial front. Although this tradition arguably stretches back to at
least 1880,95 the most well-known instance occurred in the Court’s 1989
decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.96 In Croson, the Court encountered a program enacted by the Richmond City Council that was
designed to steer a larger percentage of city construction contracts to
companies owned by racial minorities.97 Richmond closely modeled its
program on a federally enacted program from the 1970s, which the Court
92. Id. Relatedly, Warren also recognized racial salience in observing that “custodial
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of
individuals.” Id. at 455. In the footnote accompanying this point, moreover, Warren noted
the potential connection between interrogation methods and false confessions: “The most
recent conspicuous example occurred in New York, in 1964, when a Negro of limited
intelligence confessed to two brutal murders and a rape which he had not committed.” Id.
at 455 n.24.
93. Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme Court—A Judicial
Biography 591 (1983) (quoting early draft of Chief Justice Warren’s opinion).
94. Id. (quoting Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Chief Justice
Earl Warren (May 11, 1966)).
95. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (contending “[i]f in those
States where the colored people constitute a majority of the entire population a law should
be enacted excluding all white men from jury service” such statute would violate equal
protection).
96. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
97. Id. at 477–79 (describing Richmond’s Minority Business Utilization Plan).
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declared constitutional in Fullilove v. Klutznick.98 In determining whether
to apply strict scrutiny or a less exacting standard, Croson noted: “If one
aspect of the judiciary’s role under the Equal Protection Clause is to protect ‘discrete and insular minorities’ from majoritarian prejudice or indifference . . . some maintain that these concerns are not implicated when
the ‘white majority’ places burdens upon itself.”99 But this justification for
viewing affirmative action with relaxed scrutiny, an idea advanced by
Professor John Hart Ely, had no bearing on Richmond’s program. As
Croson noted, no white majority had disadvantaged itself here:
In this case, blacks constitute approximately 50% of the population of the city of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the city
council are held by blacks. The concern that a political majority
will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on
unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to
militate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial
scrutiny in this case.100
In support of this proposition, Croson again drew on Professor Ely’s
scholarship, quoting him as arguing: “‘Of course it works both ways: a law
that favors Blacks over Whites would be suspect if it were enacted by a
predominantly Black legislature.’ ”101 By prominently recognizing
Richmond’s racial composition and that of its city council, Croson undercut the program by raising the specter of what is sometimes derisively
referred to as “self-dealing.”102
98. 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (upholding “minority business enterprise” provision of
Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, tit. 1, § 103, 91 Stat. 116, 116–17
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (2006)).
99. Id. at 495 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938);
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 170 (1980)).
100. Id. at 495–96.
101. Id. at 496 (quoting John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 739 n.58 (1974)).
102. See John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 Stan. L.
Rev. 607, 621 (1998) (“A central theme of our Constitution and critical function of our
judiciary is the preclusion, not the privileging, of self-dealing maneuvers on the part of
incumbents seeking to perpetuate their incumbency or otherwise promote the fortunes of
their party.” (footnote omitted)). Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Ricci is, not
insignificantly, driven by New Haven’s racial atmospherics in general and concerns about
self-dealing in particular. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2684–88 (2009) (Alito, J.,
concurring). Given that concerns about self-dealing motivated at least some justices in the
Ricci majority, this may help to explain Justice Kennedy’s decision in the case to draw
Ricci’s governing standard directly from Croson. See id. at 2675 (majority opinion) (“The
Court has held that certain government actions to remedy past racial discrimination—
actions that are themselves based on race—are constitutional only where there is a ‘strong
basis in evidence’ that the remedial actions were necessary.” (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at
500)).
During oral argument regarding Louisville, Kentucky’s school integration program in
2006, Justice Scalia seemed to suggest that racial motives—either benign or malignant—
could be discerned from knowing the race of decisionmakers. Solicitor General Paul
Clement suggested that, even allowing that the school board’s goal of achieving greater
integration was “benign,” its motivation did not mean that the Court should scrutinize the
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2. No Problem. — Judges have also recognized race to suggest that no
racial problem exists that requires judicial intervention. In the criminal
context, Justice Robert Jackson deployed racial recognition in a case
presenting facts that were, in some respects, a mirror image of those involving the Scottsboro Boys. In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, the Court in 1944
found that a confession from a murder suspect had been coerced and,
accordingly, granted him relief.103 But unlike many of the criminal cases
arising from southern states that drew the Court’s attention during this
era, the criminal defendant claiming that he had confessed involuntarily
was not a marginalized black person. And for one Justice, at least, that
was no minor detail. “This is not the case of an ignorant and unrepresented defendant who has been the victim of prejudice,” Justice Jackson
noted in dissent.104 “Ashcraft was a white man of good reputation, good
position, and substantial property.”105
Two decades before Ashcraft, the Court in 1927 issued its notorious
decision in Buck v. Bell, which validated state authority to force sterilizations upon women who were in some way deemed deficient.106 In Buck’s
most famous line, Justice Holmes’s opinion for the Court provided the
ready-made aphorism: “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”107
But before arriving at that rhetorical climax, Holmes set the stage in part
by racially recognizing the woman Virginia sought to sterilize. “Carrie
Buck is a feeble minded white woman who was committed to the State
Colony above mentioned in due form,” Justice Holmes wrote.108 “She is
the daughter of a feeble minded woman in the same institution, and the
mother of an illegitimate feeble minded child.”109
Justice Holmes likely mentioned Buck’s race for two closely related
but conceptually distinct reasons, both of which supported the notion
that the racial dynamics undergirding this case did not cry out for judicial
intervention. First, racial recognition allowed Justice Holmes to identify
Buck’s sterilization as part of the flourishing eugenics movement’s desire
program less than strictly. Oral Argument at 25:38, Meredith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 548 U.S. 938 (2006) (No. 05-915), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/20002009/2006/2006_05_915/argument (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Justice Scalia
was not, however, prepared to accept that the school board’s plan stemmed from good
intentions: “Do we know the race of the school board here? I mean, that was not—how do
we know these are benign school boards? Is it stipulated that they are benign school
boards?” Id. at 26:03.
103. 322 U.S. 143, 155–56 (1944).
104. Id. at 173 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding Virginia statute providing for sterilization
of inmates deemed deficient in order to promote welfare of patient and society).
107. Id. For an argument attacking the veracity of Holmes’s factual predicate, see
generally Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme
Court, and Buck v. Bell (2008) (discussing history of eugenics and criticizing decision in
Buck v. Bell).
108. Buck, 274 U.S. at 205.
109. Id.
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to improve the white race scientifically by preventing whites deemed undesirable from reproducing.110 Buck came down just one year after the
publication of the popular jeremiad, Our Testing Time: Will the White Race
Win Through?,111 and just two years after the fictional character Tom
Buchanan expressed deep apprehension regarding the future of the
white race in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby.112 It seems readily predictable, then, that notes on Buck’s “family history” prepared by Dr.
Albert Priddy—the director of her institution and a leading eugenicist of
his day—portrayed Buck as a discredit to her race. “‘These people belong
to the shiftless, ignorant, and worthless class of antisocial whites of the
South,’” Priddy wrote.113
Second, racial recognition allowed Holmes to make clear that Buck
was not a racial minority, an ugly hypothetical that may have cast the
sterilization program in a considerably less favorable light. Indeed, at oral
argument, Buck’s counsel raised the racial issue by noting “‘new classes . . . even races may be brought within the scope of such regulation.’”114 As early as 1913, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Smith v.
Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded invalidated a sterilization statute in part
out of the concern that “the feeble-minded and epileptics are not the
only persons in the community whose elimination as undesirable citizens
would, or might in the judgment of the Legislature, be a distinct benefit
to society.”115 Erasing any ambiguity regarding the identity of who these
unnamed other “persons in the community” might be, Smith stated: “Racial differences, for instance, might afford a basis for such an opinion in
communities where that question is unfortunately a permanent and paramount issue.”116
110. See Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a Eugenic Reformer: Rhetoric in
the Writing of Constitutional Law, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 833, 843–44 (1986) (“During the early
twentieth century, many shared Holmes’ belief that science could breed a better race. The
science of improving ‘the race’ by breeding was the science of eugenics.” (footnote
omitted)).
111. See generally J.H. Curle, Our Testing Time: Will the White Race Win Through?
(1926) (contending that white race must avoid degeneration by preventing reproduction
of unfit members of race).
112. F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby 12–13 (Scribner 2004) (1925) (quoting
Buchanan extolling virtues of book entitled The Rise of the Colored Empires).
113. Lombardo, supra note 107, at 134 (quoting Deposition of Harry Laughlin,
Transcript of Record at 41, Buck, 274 U.S. 200 (No. 292)).
114. Victoria F. Nourse, In Reckless Hands: Skinner v. Oklahoma and the Near
Triumph of American Eugenics 29, 185 n.37 (2008) (quoting Buck, 274 U.S. at 202).
115. 88 A. 963, 966 (N.J. 1913).
116. Id. Professor Nourse has suggested that this roundabout language may refer to
the South. Nourse, supra note 114, at 29 (interpreting court’s language as “presumably”
referring to South). History would prove the New Jersey Supreme Court prescient
regarding sterilization’s impact on blacks. See id. at 158 (“In the 1970s, for example, one
federal court found that over 100,000 people had been sterilized under federal health and
welfare programs, and one study found that over half of them were black.” (citations
omitted)).
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The Court has also appeared to use racial recognition as a method
for ascertaining (or perhaps more aptly, asserting) black views more
broadly. One prominent instance occurred in Georgia v. Ashcroft, when
the Court rebuffed a challenge to the state’s redistricting plan filed under
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in 2003.117 In vacating the district
court’s finding that Georgia’s reconfigured boundaries were retrogressive
to the electoral power of racial minorities, the Court appeared to place
considerable emphasis upon the fact that black politicians supported the
new plan. For example, the Court observed that, when the Georgia
Senate adopted the plan by a narrow majority in 2001, “[t]en of the
eleven black Senators voted for the plan.”118 Additionally, the Court recognized the race of individual black politicians who testified in support of
the plan. In identifying Senator Robert Brown, who led the redistricting
effort, the Court noted: “Senator Brown, who is black, chaired the subcommittee that developed the Senate plan at issue here.”119 The Court
recognized race with slightly more subtlety—but perhaps greater imprecision—in identifying the Senate’s majority leader, Charles Walker:
“Senator Walker testified that it was important to attempt to maintain a
Democratic majority in the Senate because ‘we [African-Americans] have
a better chance to participate in the political process under the
Democratic majority than we would have under a Republican majority.’”120 The Court’s insertion of “[African-Americans]” may have introduced imprecision because the “we” in that sentence could also conceivably mean “Democrats,” “black Democrats,” “Democratic politicians,” or
even “black Democratic politicians.”
It merits briefly noting here that Georgia v. Ashcroft did not observe
the racial identity of every black decisionmaker who played a role in the
case. Most notably, the Court declined to observe the racial composition
of the special three-judge district court panel whose decision it reversed.121 That panel, drawn from judges serving on Washington, D.C.’s
federal bench, was composed of Judge Harry Edwards, Judge Emmet
117. 539 U.S. 461, 485–91 (2003) (rejecting district court’s application of law); see
also Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 Election
L.J. 21, 21 (2004) (discussing how case departed from prior section 5 analyses).
118. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 471.
119. Id. at 469.
120. Id. at 469–70 (alteration in original) (quoting plaintiffs’ exhibits). The Court
also seems to have relied upon readers’ racial (and historical) awareness of another
supporter of Georgia’s redistricting plan, U.S. Congressman John Lewis. Lewis was, of
course, one of the genuine heroes of the civil rights movement. See, e.g., Taylor Branch,
Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1945–1964, at 379–80 (1988) (describing
Lewis’s involvement in civil rights sit-ins). But Ashcroft initially identified him merely as
“Lewis, who represents the Atlanta area.” Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 472. Toward the opinion’s
crescendo, however, the Court does have Lewis speak on behalf of black voters and
portrays its decision as advancing Lewis’s conception of the civil rights movement’s goal of
“creating the beloved community.” Id. at 489–91.
121. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S. 461.
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Sullivan, and Judge Louis Oberdorfer.122 The Court notes that Judge
Oberdorfer alone agreed with the Supreme Court’s ultimate resolution
of the case, as Judge Edwards and Judge Sullivan both found that
Georgia’s plan violated section 5.123 It does not mention, however, that
Judge Oberdorfer is white and that Judge Edwards and Judge Sullivan are
black.124
It would, of course, be highly unusual for the Supreme Court to note
the racial identity of the judges who issued the decision below. People in
many different quarters would regard it as deeply inappropriate for a judicial body even to intimate that a judge’s opinion was shaped by his or
her race. Yet, making the same intimation repeatedly regarding politicians’ views—as occurred in Georgia v. Ashcroft—succeeded in raising precious few eyebrows. The contours of racial recognition may not necessarily be coherent, but they are familiar.
II. PITFALLS
This Part identifies two prominent types of racial recognition that
courts should abandon. First, courts should generally avoid issuing opinions that recognize race asymmetrically—both within the confines of a
particular opinion (micro-asymmetry) and across opinions of the same ilk
(macro-asymmetry). Second, courts should abandon writing opinions
that recognize race gratuitously. Both the micro-asymmetry and gratuitous types of racial recognition should be relatively easy for judges to
avoid. If courts internalized norms favoring the elimination of such references from opinions, the judicial conventions of racial recognition would
be dramatically improved. For its part, macro-symmetry is considerably
more difficult to obtain, and may involve at least one serious drawback.
Nevertheless, the process of striving toward the macro-symmetrical goal
would likely yield beneficial results—even if that goal remains
unobtainable.
A. Asymmetry
1. Micro-asymmetry. — A particularly promising method of improving
judicial uses of race—one that courts could adopt with relative ease—is to
122. Id. at 29.
123. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 474–75.
124. See Diversity on the Bench, Fed. Judicial Ctr., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/
nDsearch?race=African+American (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct.
20, 2011) (listing Judges Edwards and Sullivan as African American). At least one of the
black judges who served on the special three-judge panel may not have minded if the
Supreme Court had recognized his race for the idea that it provides him with a racialized
judicial perspective. See Harry T. Edwards, Race and the Judiciary, 20 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev.
325, 329 (2002) (“If I sometimes bring unique perspectives to judicial problems—
perspectives that are mine in whole or in part because I am black—that is a good thing. . . .
[J]udges’ different professional and life experiences have some bearing on how they
confront various problems that come before them.”).
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root out the practice of asymmetrical racial recognition within the confines of a single case. Too often courts consider similarly situated individuals and racially identify some, but not all, of those individuals. This
shortcoming was, of course, a primary ill that plagued Justice Kennedy’s
racial recognition of Vincent Lewis in Ricci.125 Such racial asymmetry results in two central defects. First, it provides an incomplete account of the
underlying factual dispute. Second, in practice, racial asymmetry often
naturalizes whiteness, treating nonwhite actors as deviating from the racial norm. When judges racially identify one person, they should seriously
contemplate whether other, similarly situated individuals should also be
racially identified. It will be the rare case, indeed, that actually calls for
racial asymmetry. And if judges believe that they have such a rare case,
they should explain why the case demands asymmetry.
Racial asymmetry has sometimes muted the important message that
race-based prejudice against minorities offends both nonwhites and
whites. Indeed, the Court missed an opportunity to send precisely that
message in Virginia v. Black,126 a 2003 First Amendment decision weighing a Virginia statute that made it a felony “for any person . . . , with the
intent of intimidating any person or group . . . , to burn . . . a cross on the
property of another, a highway or other public place.”127 The Court in
Black heard consolidated cases arising from two separate cross-burning
incidents. Ill-advisedly, though, Black treated the people that had been
allegedly “intimidat[ed]” in those two incidents in racially distinct
manners.128
Regarding the first incident, Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the
Court expressly recognized the race of the individual targeted for the
cross burning. “On May, 2, 1998, respondents Richard Elliott and
Jonathan O’Mara, as well as a third individual, attempted to burn a cross
on the yard of James Jubilee,” Justice O’Connor wrote.129 “Jubilee, an
African-American, was Elliott’s next-door neighbor in Virginia Beach,
Virginia.”130 The three cross-burners were apparently spurred to action
after Jubilee inquired with Elliott’s mother about the sound of gunshots
ringing out from the Elliott backyard.131 As Jubilee pulled out of his
driveway the morning after the cross burning, “he noticed the partially
burned cross approximately 20 feet from his house” and became “‘very
nervous’ because . . . ‘a cross burned in your yard . . . tells you that it’s just
the first round.’”132
125. See supra text accompanying notes 12–22 (describing effect of Justice Kennedy’s
decision to identify one witness’s race while omitting mention of other witnesses’ race).
126. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
127. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (2009), invalidated by Black, 538 U.S. 343.
128. Black, 538 U.S. at 367–68.
129. Id. at 350.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting joint appendix).
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Slightly less than five months after the Virginia Beach incident, Barry
Black led a Ku Klux Klan rally in Cana, Virginia that culminated in the
burning of a cross. But in contrast to Justice O’Connor’s treatment of
Jubilee’s racial identity, Black did not overtly designate the race of the
person who was alleged to have been intimidated by the Cana cross burning. “Rebecca Sechrist, who was related to the owner of the property
where the rally took place, ‘sat and watched to see wha[t] [was] going on’
from the lawn of her in-laws’ house,” Justice O’Connor wrote.133 “She
looked on as the Klan prepared for the gathering and subsequently conducted the rally itself.”134 During the rally preceding the cross burning,
Sechrist listened as speakers—in her words—“‘talked real bad about the
blacks and the Mexicans,’” and heard one man say “‘he would love to
take a .30/.30 and just random[ly] shoot the blacks.’”135 Sechrist testified
at Black’s trial that such talk made her feel “‘very . . . scared’” and that
seeing the cross burning caused her to feel “‘awful’” and “‘terrible.’”136
In Black, the Court held that states, without violating the First
Amendment, “may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate.”137 Black would have been strengthened, however, had the Court
made express what it left implied: whites, too, may find the conduct of
white supremacists to be both offensive and intimidating. Even setting
aside that the Ku Klux Klan has long despised an eclectic collection of
racial and nonracial groups, the Klan burned crosses on the lawns of
whites who were believed to support racial equality during the Civil
Rights Movement.138 Yet Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Black
opened by coming perilously close to intimating that nonblacks simply
cannot grasp the meaning of a burning cross. “In every culture, certain
things acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders can comprehend,”
Justice Thomas began.139 Although it is possible that Justice Thomas
meant to suggest that geographic lines separate insiders from outsiders
with respect to cross burning, the more plausible reading is that he had

133. Id. at 348 (quoting joint appendix).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 348–49 (quoting joint appendix).
136. Id. at 349 (quoting joint appendix).
137. Id. at 347. Black did, however, invalidate the Virginia statute at issue because it
deemed unconstitutional the statute’s provision that found cross burning served as prima
facie evidence of intent to intimidate. Id. at 347–48.
138. See, e.g., Klan Active in Mobile: Burns Cross at Home of White Woman Backing
Negro Pupil, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1956, at 20 (“About 100 horn-blaring, shouting
members of the Ku Klux Klan burned a ten-foot cross last night at the home of a white
woman who is trying to get a Negro child admitted to a white public school.”).
139. Black, 583 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’s opinion does
not always demonstrate this overly circumscribed conception of who may feel threatened
by cross burning. See id. at 391 (“But the perception that a burning cross is a threat and a
precursor of worse things to come is not limited to blacks.”).
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racial lines in mind.140 Had the Court noted Sechrist’s race, it would have
plainly belied the notion that whites lack racial standing to object to
speech by white supremacists.141 It may be no coincidence that the one
justice on the Virginia Supreme Court who wrote an opinion that would
have validated the statute noted that Sechrist was “a Caucasian female.”142
By racially recognizing Sechrist, that dissenting opinion also recognized
that the commitment to racial justice extends to all races.
One might argue that, in noting that the Klan rally occurred on the
property of Sechrist’s in-laws, Black implicitly acknowledged Sechrist’s
whiteness. It is difficult to believe, this thinking would run, that the son of
people willing to host a Klan rally would marry a nonwhite woman. But
children often hold quite distinct worldviews from their parents. Apart
from leaving some readers only to wonder about Sechrist’s racial identity,
moreover, the approach in Black has the unfortunate consequence of
treating whiteness as the default.143 Not only is there no apparent reason
to avoid revealing Sechrist’s race, affirmative good could come from noting that she was white.
Black thus provides an excellent illustration of why it would be mistaken to limit racial recognition to instances only where it appears required.144 Treating race symmetrically in Black, of course, need not mean
revealing Sechrist’s race, but instead could result in concealing Jubilee’s
race.145 Nothing in either the Virginia statute’s text or in the Court’s interpretation limited the statute’s applicability to protecting people on racial grounds from intimidation. Accordingly, race could conceivably be
removed from the equation altogether.
Removing race, however, would often deprive judicial opinions of
vital context that illuminates the modern racial landscape. In Black, the
reader would lose something important by not knowing that it was a black
man whom Elliott and his accomplices sought to teach a lesson for overstepping what they perceived as the prevailing racial boundaries. But we
140. For an argument suggesting that Justice Thomas’s race caused his colleagues to
defer to his views on cross burning in Black, see Guy-Uriel Charles, Colored Speech: Cross
Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the Crits?, 93 Geo. L.J. 575, 577 (2005).
141. See Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
1745, 1788–1801 (1989) (arguing against legitimacy of racial standing in legal
scholarship).
142. Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 748 (Va. 2001) (Hassell, J., dissenting).
143. See Margalynne J. Armstrong & Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching Race/
Teaching Whiteness: Transforming Colorblindness to Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 635,
671 (2008) (“The norm of whiteness continues to permeate U.S. society.”).
144. See Brooks, supra note 25, at 2092 (suggesting courts should racially identify “as
minimally as possible”).
145. Cf. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1436 (1988) (contending remedy for finding
capital punishment violated Equal Protection Clause could conceivably require executing
more people who claimed lives of black victims, rather than abolishing death penalty).
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lose something, too, by not knowing with certainty that it is as a white
person that Sechrist found racially-offensive speech intimidating.146
2. Macro-asymmetry. — Approaching race symmetrically is relatively
easy to achieve within the confines of a single case. Assuming that the
judge who drafts an opinion has internalized the value of racial symmetry
and that no judge within the majority vehemently opposes the practice, it
should not prove difficult to eliminate asymmetrical racial recognition
within a lone opinion. At one level removed from the individual case,
judges should seek to adopt a generally consistent framework for racial
recognition across their opinions. Thus, if a judge recognizes race in a
particular type of case, that judge should have a strong reason for adopting a different approach in subsequent opinions involving that particular
type of case. If the judge does decide to take a different racial tack, that
judge should at least consider explaining what motivated the altered
approach.
Judges should also contemplate the problems attendant to an asymmetrical approach to race on the macro-level. Such an approach would
mean abandoning the highly idiosyncratic and incoherent approach to
race that has thus far dominated judicial opinions, and would mean considering whether there are some types of cases that require a consistent
approach to racial recognition. This is not to say that courts should lock
themselves into an approach going forward that they will adhere to forevermore even in the face of very different racial dynamics. The ossification
of racial recognition is likely even less desirable than the current
incoherence.147
A racially symmetrical approach on a macro-level might be particularly beneficial when courts confront decisionmakers who are responsible
for implementing affirmative action programs. In Croson, as discussed
above, the Court—relying upon Professor Ely’s scholarship—recognized
the racial composition of Richmond, Virginia and its majority-black city
council in invalidating the program designed to steer more business to
minority-owned contracting companies.148 This racial recognition of the
decisionmaker in Croson marked a sharp departure from the Court’s standard operating procedure, both when it weighed the constitutionality of
affirmative action programs pre-Croson and when it has weighed such programs post-Croson. Tellingly, the Court in Fullilove, which was decided
146. Justices have previously recognized race in instances where doing so serves, in
part, to reveal that whites can be fierce advocates in the cause for racial justice. In a 1961
case arising from an individual’s refusal to testify before the House Un-American Activities
Committee, Justice Black—writing for Chief Justice Warren, Justice Douglas, and himself—
began his dissenting opinion by noting: “The petitioner in this case . . . has for some time
been at odds with strong sentiment favoring racial segregation in his home State of
Kentucky. A white man himself, the petitioner has nonetheless spoken out strongly against
that sentiment.” Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 438 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
147. For a discussion of the dangers of ossification, see infra Part III.A.2.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 96–102 (discussing Croson and Court’s
reliance on Professor Ely’s discussion of laws enacted by majority-black legislatures).
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some six years after Ely’s article appeared, made no mention of
Congress’s racial composition—the decisionmaking body that instituted
the affirmative action program.149
There may well be legitimate reasons for recognizing the decisionmakers’ race in both Fullilove and Croson. Conversely, there may be
legitimate reasons for omitting the race of decisionmakers in both
cases.150 But it seems awfully difficult to locate legitimacy in the decision
to have such racial considerations act as a factor in one case but drop out
of the analysis altogether in the other.151 It is certainly possible, if not
especially plausible, that the Court’s decision in Croson first illuminated
the significance of the decisionmaker’s race in affirmative action cases.
But if Croson taught this lesson in 1989, the Court promptly forgot it. Just
one year after Croson, no express racial recognition of decisionmakers appeared in any of the Court’s opinions regarding the affirmative action
program at issue in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.152 Nor did the Court
address the race of the University of Michigan’s decisionmakers when it
examined two affirmative action programs in 2003.153
In the affirmative action context, identifying the racial composition
of the decisionmaking body only when that body is made up of racial
minorities is misguided. Doing so suggests that minority officials are particularly prone to issuing legislation that is not public-spirited, and that
their acts must be inspected with additional rigor. Adopting an approach
to affirmative action that eschewed such macro-asymmetry—which is the
principle that Professor Ely actually articulated154—would defuse that
dangerous suggestion.
149. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453–54 (1980) (discussing legislative history
of statute requiring “minority business enterprises” to receive ten percent of public works
grants).
150. Writing a decade before Croson, Professor Van Alstyne registered a particularly
allergic reaction to this mode of inquiry. See Van Alstyne, supra note 28, at 800–01
(“[S]urely it would be objected that it is the worst sort of racism to suppose that a plan
inaugurated by a predominantly black elected body is more suspect than an identical plan
inaugurated by a predominantly white one.”).
151. Cf. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 Colum. L. Rev.
1060, 1104 n.205 (1991) (“If the concern of the Court [in Croson] was the ability of
minorities to dominate local governing units, it overestimated the power of black officials
in a white economy and underestimated the power of minority blocs in Congress (Fullilove
being a prime example).”).
152. 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (addressing FCC’s “minority preference policies”).
153. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 253–57 (2003) (discussing development of
undergraduate admissions guidelines); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 312–16 (2003)
(describing formation of law school admissions policy).
154. Not surprisingly, Professor Ely’s article was principally dedicated to exploring
instances where white decisionmakers enacted affirmative action programs to the
detriment of other whites. See John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727 (1974) (contending “‘special scrutiny’ is not
appropriate when White people have decided to favor Black people at the expense of
White people”).
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In stark contrast to the relative ease of implementing symmetrical
racial recognition on a micro level, implementing it on the macro level
raises significant problems. Apart from the rather obvious difficulties of
coordination arising from the Court being a multimember body,155 the
difficulties associated with achieving a generally consistent approach to
racial recognition are enhanced in light of personnel turnover. Complete
consistency regarding racial recognition, then, is almost certainly unobtainable. Even if total consistency could be obtained, moreover, when extended over a sufficiently long period it would likely prove undesirable.
Practices of racial recognition should enjoy the flexibility to adapt along
with society’s changing racial realities.
But if racial symmetry cannot and should not be implemented on
the broadest scale imaginable, judges should nevertheless consider how
earlier courts have recognized race and determine whether they should
continue that tradition. The result of such contemplation would be a
more reflective, considered approach to racial recognition. Such an approach would represent no meager achievement.
B. Gratuitousness
Judges should also make a concerted effort to avoid recognizing race
when doing so is gratuitous. By gratuitous, I mean racial recognition that
is “[u]ncalled for, unwarranted, unjustifiable; done or acting without a
good or assignable reason; motiveless.”156 Thus, if no legitimate reason
exists for recognizing race, courts should make an affirmative effort to
excise racial considerations from their opinions.
All instances of racial gratuitousness, however, are not created equal.
Judges should be particularly vigilant in guarding against gratuitous racial
references that pose an undue risk of confirming injurious racial stereotypes. Reasonable judges could surely disagree regarding whether a particular case involves behavior that may confirm racial stereotypes, and
whether racial recognition would be gratuitous or justifiable. Rather than
mapping out the myriad gray areas, however, it seems advisable to focus
on what should be—but, regrettably, is not—an area of common ground.
One particularly harmful type of gratuitous racial recognition that
has, alarmingly, continued into the modern judicial era arises in the context of alleged rapists who are black men.157 Justice Rehnquist’s opinion
155. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802,
832 (1982) (“There is no reason why we cannot ask each Justice to develop a principled
jurisprudence and to adhere to it consistently. What we cannot do is ask the same of the
Court, as an institution.”).
156. 1 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles 1135
(Lesley Brown ed., 4th ed. 1993).
157. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 76 (1983) (noting “[r]espondent,
who is black, remarked that he had ‘never had a white woman before’” prior to sexually
assaulting a woman, where underlying case involved jury instructions unrelated to sexual
assault (quoting Transcript of Record at 50, 262, Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (No. 81-927))).
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for the Court in New York v. Quarles, a significant criminal procedure case
decided in 1984 which found a “public safety” exception to Miranda, contains precisely this sort of harmful racial recognition.158 Rehnquist’s recitation of the initial facts—including Benjamin Quarles’s race—follows:
On September 11, 1980, at approximately 12:30 a.m., Officer
Frank Kraft and Officer Sal Scarring were on road patrol in
Queens, N.Y., when a young woman approached their car. She
told them that she had just been raped by a black male, approximately
six feet tall, who was wearing a black jacket with the name “Big
Ben” printed in yellow letters on the back. She told the officers
that the man had just entered an A & P supermarket located
nearby and that the man was carrying a gun.159
Upon entering the supermarket, the police officers chased Quarles,
cornered him in the back of the store, and frisked him only to discover an
empty shoulder holster.160 After handcuffing the suspect, Officer Kraft
inquired about the gun’s location, and Quarles responded: “[T]he gun is
over there.”161 A search behind a nearby display of cartons, toward which
Quarles had gestured, revealed a loaded revolver.162 The Court held that
public safety considerations justified Officer Kraft’s failure to issue
Miranda warnings before he questioned the suspect about the gun.163
Justice Rehnquist’s decision to recognize Quarles’s race in the opinion seems gratuitous because it is unclear what work that recognition performs. The complainant provided the officers with a detailed description
of the assailant, including his race, approximate height, and the color of
his jacket (including the yellow lettering on the back). That detailed
description likely aided the officers in the heat of pursuit. But there is no
apparent reason that Justice Rehnquist’s opinion must memorialize every
single item comprising the complainant’s overall description. In no
meaningful sense does Quarles turn on the specificity of the complainant’s description. Indeed, even making the dubious assumption that
Rehnquist at that time fervently desired to prevent the erosion of
Miranda,164 omitting Quarles’s race from the opinion would not have created much danger for an ever-expanding public safety exception.
158. 467 U.S. 649 (1984); see also Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling
(With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 Geo. L.J. 1, 19 (2010) (describing
Justice Rehnquist’s approach in Quarles).
159. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 651–52 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 652.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 651.
164. See Daniel M. Katz, Institutional Rules, Strategic Behavior, and the Legacy of
Chief Justice William Rehnquist: Setting the Record Straight on Dickerson v. United States, 22
J.L. & Pol. 303, 304 (2006) (“Miranda had been a pillar of the Warren Court revolution,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist previously varied from meek support to outright dissention
from the 1966 ruling.”). But see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (“Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point
where the warnings have become part of our national culture.”).
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While the benefits of racially designating Quarles range somewhere
from the negligible to the nonexistent, the costs associated with such designations are considerable. Racial recognition in Quarles promotes the
perception of black men as sexual predators. I do not mean to suggest
that Justice Rehnquist intentionally used race to promote this perception;
I mean to suggest only that the racial recognition in Quarles has that regrettable consequence. The racial recognition in Quarles may well be motiveless, but that does nothing to rescue it from being gratuitous.165 It
hardly seems accidental that Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion in
Quarles sought to avoid those costs by declining to mention race. “Shortly
after midnight on September 11, 1980,” Justice Marshall wrote in his factual summary, “Officer Kraft and three other policemen entered an A & P
supermarket in search of respondent Quarles, a rape suspect who was
reportedly armed.”166
Five years after Quarles, Judge Posner’s opinion for the Seventh
Circuit in Wassell v. Adams contained a similarly gratuitous racial recognition in the context of rape.167 Apart from the prominence of the opinion’s author, the case merits scrutiny because several torts textbooks draw
upon Wassell to explore the concept of “degrees of negligence.”168 Legal
scholars have roundly criticized Wassell, primarily for the way that the
opinion treats rape victims.169 Curiously, though, the decision’s racial
dimensions have gone almost completely unexplored. The lone legal
scholar who has examined Wassell’s racial dynamics in a sustained fashion, moreover, offers an unsatisfying critique that condemns the opinion
at length for its theoretically racialized details but dedicates scant attention to the case’s overtly gratuitous racial recognition.170
In Wassell, Judge Posner makes a concerted effort to turn what could
have been an upsetting but otherwise generally unremarkable tort case
into a gripping narrative. Tapping into his inner Henry James, Judge
Posner recounts a story in which the details bring the opinion alive. “The
plaintiff, born Susan Marisconish, grew up on Macaroni Street in a small
town in a poor coal-mining region of Pennsylvania—a town so small and
165. See supra notes 156–158 and accompanying text (explaining gratuitousness in
opinions).
166. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 674 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
167. 865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989).
168. See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs et al., Torts and Compensation 255–59 (6th ed. 2009)
(using Wassell to examine comparative fault); David W. Robertson et al., Cases and
Materials on Torts 353–62 (4th ed. 2011) (same).
169. See, e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and
Comparative Fault, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1413, 1434–37 (1999) (criticizing Wassell’s
implications for rape victims); Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 Yale
L.J. 1039, 1114–15 (2002) (contending Wassell-type calculations of causation will be “very
resource-intensive” and costly, discouraging many victims from suing).
170. Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race
Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 269, 282–86,
291 (1994); see infra notes 197–201 and accompanying text (critiquing Professor Kastely’s
argument).
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obscure that it has no name,” Posner wrote.171 In 1985, “Susan, who by
now was 21 years old, traveled to Chicago” so that she could witness her
fiancé, Michael Wassell, graduate from naval basic training.172 For her
stay in Chicago, Susan checked into the Ron-Ric motel.173 “The Ron-Ric
is a small and inexpensive motel that caters to the families of sailors at the
Great Lakes Naval Training Station a few blocks to the east,” Posner explained.174 “The motel has 14 rooms and charges a maximum of $36 a
night for a double room. The motel was owned by Wilbur and Florena
Adams, the defendants in the case.”175 Posner next described a neighborhood adjacent to Susan’s motel. “Four blocks to the west of the Ron-Ric
motel is a high crime area: murder, prostitution, robbery, drugs—the
works,” Posner noted.176 “The Adamses occasionally warned women
guests not to walk alone in the neighborhood at night.”177 The Adamses,
however, failed to warn Susan.178
After hearing a knock on the door at 1:00 AM, Susan saw no one
when she looked through the door’s peephole.179 “She unlocked the
door and opened it all the way, thinking that Michael had come from the
base and, not wanting to wake her, was en route to the Adamses’ apartment to fetch a key to the room,” Posner wrote.180 “It was not Michael at
the door. It was a respectably dressed black man whom Susan had never seen
before.”181 The stranger then gained access to Susan’s room by asking her
for a glass of water, which she retrieved from the bathroom.182 “When she
came out of the bathroom,” Posner recounted, “the man was sitting at the
table in the room . . . . He took the water but said it wasn’t cold
enough . . . . The man went into the bathroom to get a colder glass of
water. Susan began to get nervous.”183 After he had been in the bathroom for several minutes, “[h]e poked his head out of the doorway and
asked Susan to join him in the bathroom, he wanted to show her something. She refused. After a while he emerged from the bathroom—naked
from the waist down.”184 Susan then fled the room and screamed, but the
intruder corralled her and forced her back into the room.185 “There he
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Wassell, 865 F.2d at 850.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 850–51.
Id. at 851.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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gagged her with a wash cloth,” Posner wrote.186 “He raped her at least
twice (once anally). These outrages occupied more than an hour.”187
Susan filed a negligence lawsuit against the Ron-Ric’s owners seeking
$850,000 for, inter alia, their failure to warn her.188 A jury found that the
Adamses had behaved negligently and assessed Susan’s damages at the
requested amount.189 The jury also found, however, that Susan had behaved negligently, and that her negligence accounted for 97% of the
blame for the attack; the Adamses’ negligence, conversely, accounted for
3%.190 Judge Posner’s opinion affirmed the district court on the decision
both to deny Susan’s request for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
and to deny her request for a new trial.191
As with Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Quarles, it is difficult to ascertain any legitimate reason for Judge Posner’s decision to recognize the
rapist’s race in Wassell. Indeed, nothing significant about the case pivots
on the rapist’s identity—racial, or otherwise. As Judge Posner noted,
“The rapist was never prosecuted; a suspect was caught but Susan was too
upset to identify him.”192 Wassell instead hinged on the conduct of Susan
and the Adamses.
If one were forced to concoct an explanation for Judge Posner’s inclusion of the rapist’s race in Wassell, it might be argued that when Susan
opened the motel’s door to find a black man at 1:00 AM she should
have—sartorial respectability notwithstanding—immediately closed the
door. Under this theory, Susan’s failure to do so may have heightened
her negligence in the jury’s eyes, and the opinion would have been incomplete had it excluded race from the equation. The problem with this
explanation, however, is that blackness standing alone—what Posner
long ago referred to as “race per se”193—does not materially alter the analysis of Susan’s conduct. When Susan opened the motel door to find a
man of any race who was not her fiancé, it seemed incumbent upon her
to end the encounter rather than to retrieve a glass of water for him.194
It might also be objected that Posner’s opinion in Wassell, like
Rehnquist’s in Quarles, includes a wide array of facts from the trial record
that had little or no effect on either the jury’s deliberations or the appellate decision. The precise name of Susan’s hometown street, it seems safe
to say, did not figure prominently in the minds of the jury or the judges.
Judge Posner sought to give Wassell literary treatment, and such treat186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 852.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 852, 856.
192. Id. at 852.
193. Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 8.
194. See Wassell, 865 F.2d at 855 (“Everyone, or at least the average person, knows
better than to open his or her door to a stranger in the middle of the night.”).
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ments rise or fall upon the details. The attacker was not raceless, after all,
and it would have amounted to authorial malpractice to leave this particular detail on the editing room floor. Such details, this objection might
continue, bring legal opinions alive, and we should be wary of suggestions
that would drain that vitality.
I have no desire whatsoever to wring details from judicial opinions.
To the contrary, judges should enjoy wide discretion to craft their opinions as they see fit. Nevertheless, judges should treat race with special
care and excise gratuitous racial recognition—particularly from judicial
opinions that could be read to confirm stereotypes. Judge Posner ought
to feel free to inform readers of Susan’s nameless hometown, the name of
her childhood street, and just about any other detail that he deems appropriate. But he should not view race as he would merely any other
detail.
Some observers may contend that it simply asks too much of judges
to avoid mentioning race gratuitously in their judicial opinions. Provided
that judges are not invoking racial considerations with actual malice, it
seems silly to request them to be conscious of, say, noting a criminal defendant’s race when it is mentioned during a trial and appears in the
record. Yet requesting that judges avoid injecting race in situations where
it has no legitimate place is a standard that is far from impossible to meet.
Indeed, this standard has recently governed the modern political world.
In 1988, Lee Atwater’s notorious Willie Horton advertisement in support
of George H.W. Bush’s campaign against Michael Dukakis was roundly
criticized for violating this precept.195 Conversely, when Senator John
McCain ran against then-Senator Barack Obama for the presidency in
2008, he deliberately refused to dwell on Obama’s relationship with Reverend Jeremiah Wright in order to avoid being perceived as having injected race into the election.196 If a politician deliberately avoided inserting race into a campaign for the nation’s highest office, it hardly
seems too onerous for life-tenured judges to hold themselves to that same
standard.
Surprisingly, the only previous legal scholar who has undertaken a
substantial examination of Wassell’s racial aspects failed to dedicate more
than passing attention to the gratuitous racial recognition of Susan’s attacker.197 Instead of focusing on explicit racial gratuitousness, Professor
Amy Kastely directed her ire principally toward what she understood to
195. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Race Card: How Bluffing About Bias Makes
Race Relations Worse 9–10 (2008) (referring to “notorious ad campaign that many felt
exploited racial bigotry”).
196. See Dana Milbank, Unleashed, Palin Makes a Pit Bull Look Tame, Wash. Post,
Oct. 7, 2008, at A3 (reporting McCain instructed his campaign staff that “racially explosive
attacks related to Obama’s former pastor, the Rev. Jeremiah Wright, [were] off limits”).
197. See Kastely, supra note 170, at 291 (noting “the particular case of rape of a white
woman by a black man has such a powerful history and continuing presence in the
narratives of white supremacy that a judge would draw attention to race in cases in which
that story could be re-told and re-affirmed”).
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be Judge Posner’s implicit racialization of the neighborhood bordering
the Ron-Ric.198 “Judge Posner described the neighborhood close to the
motel as ‘a high-crime area: murder, prostitution, robbery, drugs—the
works,’” Kastely writes.199 “Whatever basis this metonymy may have in the
frequency of crime in that neighborhood, Judge Posner did not claim
that Wassell had any specific information about a historical record of
crime. Instead . . . this description functions to name this neighborhood
as black.”200 In addition, Professor Kastely contends that “Judge Posner’s
dismissive, disrespectful description of the neighborhood is striking” and
asserts that he engages in “racist presumptions.”201
This interpretation of Wassell misses the mark. Judge Posner almost
certainly emphasizes the neighborhood’s criminality near the motel not,
as Professor Kastely avows, in order to code it as black. More conceivably,
he does so in order to place the Adamses’ failure to warn Susan about the
surrounding environs in its proper context—a pivotal fact in order to
assess the jury’s verdict finding that the motel owners were partially responsible for the assault. It is difficult to envision how Judge Posner
might go about addressing a high crime rate in this area without, in the
eyes of some, implicitly suggesting that the neighborhood is black. The
opinion’s characterization of the crime problem, after all, uses generic
crime terminology (“murder, prostitution, robbery, drugs”).202 One
shudders to imagine the outcry had Judge Posner used terminology that
carries a much stronger racial whiff. If Judge Posner is accused of “racist
presumptions” for using generic terms—had he in Wassell substituted,
say, crack for drugs—the response may have ventured beyond apoplectic.
But sometimes a cigar is just a cigar,203 and sometimes a high-crime area
is just a high-crime area.
None of the foregoing should be taken as denying either that judicial opinions sometimes implicitly invoke racial considerations or that
race and crime are interwoven in the American imagination in myriad
ways.204 Rather than initially beseeching judges to remove the allegedly
race-coded references within their opinions, it seems more sensible to
begin by asking judges to contemplate their gratuitous usage of explicit
198. Id. at 285.
199. Id. (quoting Wassell, 865 F.2d at 751).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 283, 286. Professor Kastely is not the only academic who has asserted that
Posner suffers from untoward racial bias. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone:
Race and White Privilege, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1637, 1661 (1999) (criticizing what he labels
“Judge Posner’s racism”).
202. Wassell, 865 F.2d at 851.
203. John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 570 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992)
(attributing this phrasing to Sigmund Freud).
204. See David Cole, Can Our Shameful Prisons Be Reformed?, N.Y. Rev. Books, Nov.
19, 2009, at 41, 41 (“The correlation of race and crime in the public’s mind reinforces
prejudice that affects every African-American.”).
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racial recognition. Judges should demonstrate that they can crawl before
we ask them to sprint.
III. POSSIBILITIES
This Part identifies and analyzes four different, complementary approaches that courts should consider implementing when they confront a
case that presents an opportunity to recognize race. First, and perhaps
most importantly, courts should draft a written explanation for their provisional decision to recognize race in a particular opinion, a process that
will require judges to dedicate more reflection to a practice that often
appears startlingly unreflective. Second, courts should contemplate
whether racial equality may be better served by not recognizing race,
even if the legal problem has a racial element. Third, courts should consider a technique of racial inversion to determine whether racial recognition may be undesirable. Fourth, courts should bear in mind that being
opposed to racial classifications need not mean that one must endorse a
colorblind approach to law—a court can articulate a problem’s racial
dimensions without violating the anticlassification principle.
A. Explanation
When courts recognize the racial identity of particular parties or
other individuals, they should typically endeavor to explain what work the
racial recognition is doing. Openly discussing race, to be sure, can be a
freighted and awkward endeavor, and such discussions have led to raw
feelings even between judges who otherwise enjoy a close friendship.205
But having judges attempt to articulate expressly why race is pertinent in
the context of particular decisions would result in two broad types of benefits. First, regarding intrinsic benefits, judicial efforts to explain why race
matters will increase judges’ cognitive attention to racial recognition, and
should result in a lower number of undesirable invocations of race. Second, regarding extrinsic benefits, judicial explanations for racial recognition would guard against racial ossification and speculation as to judicial
motivation, while simultaneously increasing the opportunity for more
searching racial reform.
205. The difficulty of talking openly about race is well-illustrated by an unusually testy
exchange between Justice Ginsburg and Justice Scalia that reportedly occurred during the
Court’s deliberations regarding Bush v. Gore. Taking exception to her conservative
colleagues’ invocation of the Equal Protection Clause to halt the Florida recount, Justice
Ginsburg contended that the 2000 election’s actual Equal Protection Clause violation arose
not from the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion. Instead, in a footnote, Justice Ginsburg
pointed to press accounts suggesting that the votes of many black Floridians had, in effect,
been suppressed. When Justice Scalia read the footnote, he promptly sent his dear friend a
strongly-worded memorandum for Justice Ginsburg’s eyes only, contending that the
footnote succeeded in “fouling our nest” and amounted to nothing less than “Al Sharpton
tactics.” In response, Justice Ginsburg omitted the footnote from her final draft. See Jeffrey
Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court 173–74 (2007)
(recounting story of Ginsburg’s footnote).
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1. Intrinsic. — When judges offer written explanations for racial recognition, it will force them to dedicate greater thought to a practice that
often seems to occur in an unthinking, even haphazard manner. Consequently, judges would be required to exhibit more thought when they
write race-conscious decisions. Increased thought regarding such matters,
though not free of potential downsides, could dramatically improve the
current state of racial recognition.
The most obvious benefit of judges explaining their invocations of
race may not appear on the printed page at all. Indeed, that is precisely
the point. When judges put themselves through the disciplining process
of consciously determining whether a racial invocation lends itself to a
written explanation, they will in some instances conclude that no legitimate reason supports the inclusion of race. If Judge Posner in Wassell and
Justice Rehnquist in Quarles, for instance, had attempted to explain in
writing why they disclosed that the rapist in question was black, it seems
probable that the racial descriptor would have been omitted.
Not only would judges be less likely to use race gratuitously, but the
process of articulating reasons for including race would also almost certainly lead to decreased racial asymmetry. It seems unlikely that a judge
would write an opinion explaining why race was relevant with respect to
one actor, and then completely ignore (without explanation) the race of
similarly situated actors. After judges internalize the habit of eliminating
racial asymmetry on a micro level, moreover, they may also begin to
adopt some larger framework for racial recognition that could manifest
itself in a more symmetrical approach to race on a macro level.
This benefit of increased consciousness is, admittedly, closely connected to a potential cost. Judges may—in an effort to explain more thoroughly their racial references—encounter difficulty, embarrassment, or
perhaps some combination of the two feelings. At least some judges could
decide simply to eliminate racial considerations from the opinion’s text,
even though these considerations continue to shape their judicial opinions. Attempting to bring race closer to the surface may, in other words,
have exactly the opposite consequence of driving race further subterranean. This drawback is troubling, as are proposals generally that may deprive judicial opinions of some measure of candor.206 Nevertheless, the
benefits of judicial discussion of race, in my estimation, considerably outweigh this potential cost.
2. Extrinsic. — Judicial explanations for recognizing race have three
primary extrinsic benefits. First, judicial explanations of racial pertinence
may help to prevent race from being frozen into the law. Second, having
courts explain why race is pertinent may reduce speculation regarding
why racial considerations are being invoked. Third, judicial explanations
206. For a thoughtful examination of frankness from the bench, see Micah
Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 987, 989–91 (2008) (articulating and
defending principle of judicial sincerity).
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could increase the likelihood that decisionmakers will engage in broader
efforts at racial reform.
Judicial explanations for racial recognition might well prevent race
from becoming ossified into legal decisions. One danger of suggesting
that courts adopt a more coherent approach to recognizing race is that
the increased coherence will lead to a type of racial ossification, whereby
courts would settle into a familiar (and comfortable) pattern of invoking
race in some cases and ignoring it in others. Articulating the reasons for
racial recognition, however, helps to guard against such ossification. If
the underlying societal conditions that an opinion cites for recognizing
race are altered in meaningful ways, future courts not only would be justified, but may even be required to abandon the old racial recognition
framework.
Additionally, if judges explain why they recognize race in particular
cases, it may decrease the degree of speculation surrounding racial invocations that commentators suspect are, well, suspect. Judges may have legitimate reasons for recognizing race in cases where those reasons are far
from apparent to the reader. Spelling out those reasons would at least
provide a justification for the racial recognition. Commentators could
still reject the legitimacy of that reason, but at least they would not be
forced to impute one to the court. Judicial explanations would not, of
course, eliminate speculation regarding the real motivation as opposed to
the stated one, and may even result in increased allegations of bad faith—
at least from certain quarters. Still, having a forthright discussion regarding the reasons for racial recognition would represent a distinct improvement over current uncertainty.
Finally, when judges explain why they have invoked race in a particular opinion, it increases the likelihood that the judiciary (and other decisionmakers) will contemplate undertaking broader reforms that account
for race. The potential benefit that flows from judges articulating their
reasons for supporting racial recognition is well illustrated by the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Manson v. Brathwaite.207 In Brathwaite, the
Court considered whether pretrial identification evidence must be excluded when it stems from a “suggestive and unnecessary” police procedure.208 The events giving rise to the case date back to May 1970, when
Jimmy D. Glover, an undercover police officer, paid a visit to a third-floor
apartment with the intent of buying narcotics from a known drug dealer,
“Dickie Boy” Cicero.209 After purchasing the narcotics from what was believed to be Cicero’s residence, Glover told fellow officers that the person
who sold the drugs was “‘a colored man, approximately five feet eleven
207. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
208. Id. at 99. For a helpful overview of how Brathwaite fits into the suggestive
identification doctrine more broadly, see Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and
Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1002,
1038–43 (2010) (analyzing Brathwaite’s implications).
209. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 99–100.
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inches tall, dark complexion, black hair, short Afro style, and having high
cheekbones, and of heavy build.’”210 Glover’s description prompted an
officer to suspect that the seller was not Cicero, but instead was
Brathwaite.211 The officer obtained a copy of Brathwaite’s photograph
and left it in Glover’s office. Two days after the drug purchase, Glover
discovered the photograph and confirmed that it depicted the man who
sold him drugs.212 In a fleeting but potentially significant moment of racial recognition, Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court noted: “Glover
himself was a Negro and unlikely to perceive only general features of
‘hundreds of Hartford black males,’ as the Court of Appeals stated.”213
The Court suggested in sum that Glover, being a black male, would have
been less likely to misidentify another black male than a white police officer would have been.
Brathwaite is one of the very few instances where the Court has endeavored to explain, even in passing, why race matters. More judges
would do well to follow Justice Blackmun’s lead (if not necessarily his
reasoning) and offer explanations for their invocations of race. Indeed,
his opinion in Brathwaite provides a vivid illustration of the potential benefits that could be reaped from judicial explanations. Taking Justice
Blackmun’s brief racial explanation seriously could have the dramatic effect of urging a reconceptualization of the law surrounding cross-racial
identifications.214 After all, as Brathwaite implicitly acknowledges, misidentifications may be more likely to occur interracially than they are intraracially.215 That acknowledgment could lend important support for, in
at least some circumstances, following the advice of many legal scholars
who advocate providing additional safeguards to minimize the risk of erroneous cross-racial identifications.216 As the absence of such safeguards
continues to attest some thirty-five years after Brathwaite, judicial discussions of race do nothing to guarantee meaningful racial reform. Discussing race may, however, make that reform more attainable than it otherwise would have been.
B. Unrecognition
Legal scholars who seek to eliminate racial inequality generally insist
that the most promising path toward reaching that goal requires govern210. Id. at 101 (quoting trial transcript).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 115 (quoting Brathwaite v. Mason, 527 F.2d 363, 371 (2d Cir. 1975)).
214. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal
Cases, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 934, 952 n.107 (1984) (identifying Brathwaite as “[t]he only
reference by the Court to witness-defendant racial congruence”).
215. See id. at 942–43 (noting laboratory studies reveal “it was common for the ownrace/other-race recognition rates to differ by thirty percent . . . . [O]ne study reported that
people who tried to identify persons of another race made four times as many errors as
those who attempted to identify members of their own race.” (citations omitted)).
216. See, e.g., id. at 957–85 (discussing potential safeguards).
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mental decisionmakers—including judges—to pay ever more attention to
race.217 If decisionmakers fully appreciated the role that race and racial
considerations play in American society, scholars often suggest, then racial reform would be realized. In some instances, this strategy likely will
prove effective. But it merits emphasizing that focusing attention on race
may sometimes retard rather than advance the march toward full racial
equality. Instead of permitting racial inequalities to expose larger issues
of inequality,218 judges too often seem to believe that if a racially framed
problem does not contain ongoing and overt signs of racial discrimination, then the underlying issue does not require remedy. In some instances, thus, courts may be more likely to resolve legal questions in ways
that will have the effect of reducing racial inequality if they conceive of
the problem principally along its nonracial dimensions. Unrecognizing
race may—counterintuitively—sometimes remedy racial inequality.
It is tempting to believe that this strategy constitutes a recent development on the racial front.219 But the Court’s history of recognizing (and
unrecognizing) race reveals that decisions that result in racial relief may
be more attainable when the Court does not conceive of legal issues in
primarily racial terms. In the election law context, for example, Justice
Douglas wrote two opinions for the Warren Court in cases involving state
voting restrictions. In 1959, the Court contemplated a challenge to North
Carolina’s voting literacy requirement in Lassiter v. Northampton County
Board of Elections.220 In 1966, the Court weighed a poll-tax requirement in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections.221 Although the two cases were decided just seven years apart, Justice Douglas’s opinions took divergent racial paths, with him recognizing race in Lassiter and unrecognizing race
in Harper. One might expect that, during the Warren Court era, the
Court would have been more likely to grant relief when it recognized
race and less likely to grant relief when race went unrecognized. Lassiter
and Harper, however, confound those expectations.
In Lassiter, Justice Douglas’s opinion almost immediately recognized
the race of Louise Lassiter, a black North Carolinian whose voter registra217. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Context, supra note 26, at 328–30 (arguing “focusing on
racism can provide a powerful and sensible basis for anti-discrimination doctrine”); Austin,
supra note 26, at 207 (claiming racial context is essential to courts providing adequate
relief); Carbado, supra note 25, at 964–66 (arguing recognition of Supreme Court’s role in
constructing race in Fourth Amendment context would illuminate its complicity with racist
police practices).
218. See Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, The Miner’s Canary: Enlisting Race, Resisting
Power, Transforming Democracy 11 (2002) (arguing distress of racial minorities offers
warning sign of “a danger that threatens us all”).
219. Cf. Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection,
121 Harv. L. Rev. 104, 106 (2007) (claiming “it is when Justice Kennedy stops talking
directly about race that he says something new about it”).
220. 360 U.S. 45, 45 (1959) (describing constitutional challenge to state literacy test).
221. 383 U.S. 663, 664 (1966) (outlining suit against state’s poll tax).
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tion was rejected because she declined to take a literacy test.222 The challenged statute required that aspiring voters “‘be able to read and write
any section of the Constitution of North Carolina in the English language.’”223 This was a straightforward literacy provision, Justice Douglas
contended, in that it did not afford unfettered discretion to the voting
registrar and, thus, did not act “merely [as] a device to make racial discrimination easy.”224 The statute, “applicable to members of all races, . . .
seems to us to be one fair way of determining whether a person is literate,
not a calculated scheme to lay springes for the citizen,” Justice Douglas
wrote in finding that literacy served as a decent proxy for being informed
on matters of public import.225 “Certainly we cannot condemn it on its
face as a device unrelated to the desire of North Carolina to raise the
standards for people of all races who cast the ballot.”226
Justice Douglas’s decision in Harper adopted a nonracial frame,
and—perhaps not incidentally—reached a different result regarding the
disenfranchisement measure under review. In a case consolidated with
Harper, the brief filed on behalf of one appellant, Evelyn Butts, left no
doubt as to her race. “Appellant is an adult Negro resident of Norfolk,
Virginia, who was and is qualified to vote but for her financial inability to
pay her poll tax,” the brief observed.227 But Butts’s brief did not leave the
matter there: “She is one of many such citizens, both white and nonwhite, of very poor means, who are discouraged or prevented from voting
by the poll tax and its procedural requirements and upon whom payment
of the tax creates an economic hardship.”228 Justice Douglas’s opinion
declined to note any appellant’s race. And while he observed the raciallymotivated origins of Virginia’s poll tax, he emphasized that the decision
in no way rested on the statute’s racial impact.229 Instead, Justice Douglas
hinged Harper on its economic discrimination. “Wealth, like race, creed,
or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the
electoral process,” Justice Douglas wrote.230 “To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter’s qualifications is to introduce a
capricious or irrelevant factor.”231
222. See Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 45 (identifying Lassiter as “a Negro citizen of North
Carolina”).
223. Id. at 46 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-28 (1957)).
224. Id. at 53.
225. Id. at 53–54.
226. Id. at 54.
227. Brief for Appellant at 3, Harper v. Harrison, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (No. 655), 1965
WL 115352.
228. Id. at 3–4.
229. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 n.3 (1966) (“While the
‘Virginia poll tax was born of a desire to disenfranchise the Negro,’ we do not stop to
determine whether on this record the Virginia tax in its modern setting serves the same
end.” (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 543 (1965))).
230. Id. at 668.
231. Id.
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What explains the divergent results in Lassiter and Harper? Part of the
explanation may stem from the quite distinct ways the Court perceived
the fundamental underlying problem at issue in the two cases. In Lassiter,
it seems clear that the Court went hunting for racial prejudice, a hunt
that was signaled at the beginning of the opinion when Justice Douglas
recognized Lassiter’s race. And overt racial prejudice the Court did not
find, as it noted that the literacy requirement was “applicable to members
of all races.”232 That meant, effectively, that Lassiter was out of luck. In
Harper, rather than hunting for racial prejudice, the Court instead
searched for economic inequality. Pursuant to its different search, Justice
Douglas’s opinion omitted mentioning Harper’s race. Even though
Justice Douglas did not deliver Harper in the register of racial equality,
there can be little doubt that black Virginians formed a disproportionately large percentage of the group that benefited from the poll tax’s
elimination. Lassiter and Harper combine to suggest, then, the effort to
have courts view legal problems primarily as racial problems does nothing
to guarantee the advance of racial justice. The effort may, in fact, sometimes inadvertently impair that cause.
However, it is essential not to exaggerate the role that racial recognition plays in Supreme Court decisionmaking. Indeed, many factors, apart
from the Court’s racial framing of the parties, could account for the decision to uphold the literacy requirement in Lassiter and to invalidate the
poll tax in Harper. Among other potential explanations for the two results, the Warren Court may have ascended to the height of its power in
1966, a power that it did not perceive that it held in 1959. Whatever the
precise explanation for Lassiter and Harper, though, it would be foolish to
discount wholly the role racial framing played in motivating the Court’s
two decisions.
Even if one remains skeptical of this frame’s ability to account for the
Court’s decisions in Lassiter and Harper, the way in which legal problems
are (and are not) racially framed retains vital significance in the modern
legal context. Today, when observers generally agree that racial prejudice
is far more subtle and therefore far more difficult to detect than it was
five decades ago,233 it may be wise to avoid sending judges and justices on
quests for overt racial prejudice that they may not discover. Many persistent problems of inequality that have disproportionately large impacts on
racial minorities may not be alleviated even by the eradication of racial

232. Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959). Lassiter
did, however, allow that a literacy requirement could conceivably afford the decisionmaker
so much discretion in its application as to make it vulnerable to racial challenge. Id.
(distinguishing from literacy test found in earlier case to be “merely a device to make racial
discrimination easy” due to “the great discretion it vested in the registrar” (citing Davis v.
Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff’d, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (per curiam))).
233. See Ford, supra note 195, at 33 (noting “greater disagreement as to what counts
as racism” after civil rights movement).
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prejudice.234 Accordingly, individuals who remain concerned about racial
inequality may be well advised to contemplate advocating nonracial
remedies.
C. Inversion
Even if racial considerations have drawn the judiciary’s attention to a
particular legal problem, that does not mean that a court must expressly
recognize race in its decision addressing that problem. As judges write
opinions today, it may be helpful for courts to contemplate racial inversion, whereby judges consider whether substituting a hypothetical white
person in the place of a person of color (or vice versa) would lead to a
different result.235 If racial inversion would not alter the legal result in
any way, then the Court might consider omitting race from the analysis.
In other words, implementing the racial inversion technique may sometimes lead a court to unrecognize race.
A stark illustration of how racial inversion plays out on the ground is
provided by revisiting the Court’s racial recognition in Miranda.236
There, as noted above, the Court recognized the race of minority defendants in establishing custodial interrogation’s potentially coercive atmosphere: “The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent, for example, in Miranda, where the indigent Mexican defendant was a seriously
disturbed individual with pronounced sexual fantasies, and in Stewart, in
which the defendant was an indigent Los Angeles Negro who had
dropped out of high school in the sixth grade.”237 On one level, it seems
perfectly appropriate—commendable, even—that the Court recognized
race, given both the greater public discourse regarding race during the
1960s and the way that many observers understood criminal justice issues
as integrally related to racial equality.238 On another level, though, it
234. See William Julius Wilson, More than Just Race: Being Black and Poor in the
Inner City 3–4 (2009) (arguing social structure and culture are two important factors in
persistence of racialized underclass); William Julius Wilson, Race-Specific Policies and the
Truly Disadvantaged, 2 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 272, 275 (1984) (“[T]he factors associated with
the growing woes of low-income blacks are exceedingly complex and go beyond the narrow
issue of contemporary discrimination.”).
235. This method of racial inversion owes a debt to the “reversing the groups” test
proposed by Professor Strauss as a method of exposing discriminatory intent under the
Equal Protection Clause. See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of
Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935, 956–59 (1989) (“A court applying the discriminatory intent
standard should ask: suppose the adverse effects of the challenged government decision
fell on whites instead of on blacks, or on men instead of on women. . . . If [the decision
would have been different], then the decision was made with discriminatory intent.”).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 88–94 (discussing racial recognition in
Miranda).
237. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
238. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing scholars’ connection
between criminal justice issues and racial equality). Suggesting that race was more salient
in the 1960s than it is today should not, of course, be confused for suggesting that racial
considerations now lack all salience.
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seems worth wondering what precisely would change if Miranda and
Stewart were both white, rather than Latino and black? Would the risk of
compulsion, in other words, be meaningfully lowered if the police were
interrogating two “indigent” white people, one “seriously disturbed” and
the other a sixth-grade dropout? It seems difficult to believe that—even if
the hypothetically white Miranda and Stewart felt marginally more able to
resist police interrogations than identically situated people of color—a
different legal result would apply.239 Indeed, in establishing a per se rule
in Miranda, the Court may have been partially motivated by an understanding that racial differences would not dramatically alter the ability to
resist police interrogation without the benefit of warnings.240
It is distinctly possible that an inchoate conception of racial inversion
played a role in motivating one of the most well known cases in which a
court declined to recognize race. In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture

239. This same set of questions merits being posed with respect to several criminal
cases involving confessions during the 1960s. In Sims v. Georgia, for instance, the Court in
1967 recognized Isaac Sims Jr.’s race in a case alleging that he, a black man, had raped a
white woman. 385 U.S. 538, 538 (1967). Although Sims had confessed to the crime, he had
done so only after “he was knocked down, kicked over the right eye and pulled around by
his private parts” with sufficient force that even 2–3 weeks after the incident he was, in his
words, “‘paining a right smart.’” Id. at 540–41 (quoting petitioner).
In Beecher v. Alabama, also decided in 1967, the Court recognized race when it
invalidated a confession that had been elicited under perhaps even more dire
circumstances than those that had plagued Sims. 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (per curiam).
Beecher, “a Negro convict in a state prison, escaped from a road gang in Camp Scottsboro,
Alabama,” and was suspected in the murder of a woman whose body was discovered close
to the camp the day after Beecher escaped. Id. at 35. The lower court had admitted
Beecher’s confessions in the face of truly stunning (and uncontradicted) facts. Id. at
36–38. Beecher orally confessed after being shot in the leg, having a loaded pistol pointed
at his face while a rifle was pointed at his head, and a gunshot being discharged next to his
ear. Id. at 36. Beecher’s written confessions came during the course of a “90-minute
‘conversation’” that occurred while Beecher was in a morphine-induced haze. Id. at 36–37.
Beecher also reveals the fascinating way in which subsequent judges sometimes echo an
earlier opinion’s racial recognition—perhaps unthinkingly. In 2004, nearly forty years after
the Court decided Beecher, the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion recounting the case which
retained the racial salience, even though its inquiry centered on whether the defendant
experienced similar pain before confessing. See Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915, 928 (6th
Cir. 2004) (“Beecher involved an African-American petitioner accused of raping and killing
a white woman.”).
240. The Court was probably mainly motivated to issue a per se rule in Miranda by
administrative ease. For an argument laying out the benefits of judicially articulated rules,
see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1178–79
(1989) (contending uncertainty surrounding judicial standards makes rules-based
approach preferable). It may, alas, be more accurate to describe Miranda as offering an
equally feeble rule for protecting individuals of all different races and economic
backgrounds. See David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1229, 1259–60 (2002) (“It was apparent from the outset that the
Miranda warnings . . . are at best an imperfect solution to the problem of involuntary
confessions.”).
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Co.,241 a case that has become a staple of law school curricula,242 Judge J.
Skelly Wright wrote an opinion for the D.C. Circuit finding that the
courts below had improperly concluded that they were powerless to refuse enforcement of an extraordinarily one-sided contract.243 Over a fiveyear period stretching between 1957 and 1962, Ora Lee Williams purchased several items from Walker-Thomas under an installment plan.244
The disputed contractual terms provided that, in the event Williams defaulted, Walker-Thomas could repossess every item that it had ever sold
to Williams—regardless of the amount she had paid toward the various
purchases at the time at the default.245 Judge Wright’s opinion held that,
though courts typically enforce even extremely lopsided contracts, courts
need not do so if they deem the agreement unconscionable.246 “Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party,” Judge
Wright noted.247 “Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular
case can only be determined by consideration of all the circumstances
surrounding the transaction.”248 Among other considerations, Judge
Wright instructed that a choice’s meaningfulness is often “negated by a
gross inequality of bargaining power”249 and required courts to ask: “Did
each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it,
have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract,
or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices?”250
Judge Wright’s opinion disclosed some of the salient facts about
Williams’s difficult circumstances. “‘Significantly, at the time of this and
the preceding purchases, [Walker-Thomas] was aware of [Williams]’s financial position,’”251 Judge Wright observed. “‘The reverse side of the
stereo contract listed the name of [Williams]’s social worker and her $218
monthly stipend from the government. Nevertheless, with full knowledge
that [Williams] had to feed, clothe and support both herself and seven
241. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
242. See, e.g., John P. Dawson et al., Contracts: Cases and Comment 693–97 (9th ed.
2008) (discussing unconscionability in Williams); E. Allan Farnsworth et al., Contracts:
Cases and Materials 497–501 (7th ed. 2008) (introducing section on unconscionability
with discussion of Williams).
243. Williams, 350 F.2d at 448 (“We do not agree that the court lacked the power to
refuse enforcement to contracts found to be unconscionable.”).
244. Id at 447.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 448.
247. Id. at 449.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 448 (quoting Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 916
(D.C. 1964)).
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children on this amount, [Walker-Thomas] sold her a $514 stereo
set.’”252 But the opinion nowhere expressly mentioned Williams’s race.
Williams has inspired many anguished academic commentaries suggesting that Judge Wright should have expressly recognized that the exploited consumer was black.253 Failing to disclose racial identity, some
scholars have suggested, omits a crucial detail from the unconscionability
inquiry in Williams, given that these events occurred at a time when
Washington, D.C. had only recently begun to dismantle its Jim Crow order.254 These scholars are not wholly off-base. It would hardly be astonishing, after all, if black people generally within that place and time felt
particularly disempowered regarding the negotiation of contractual
terms. But the amount of work that Williams’s race would perform in an
unconscionability determination would seem to be of trifling significance. Can it really be suggested with a straight face that an identical
contractual provision involving a white welfare recipient raising seven
children would be appreciably less unconscionable, allowing the court to
enforce the provision against a white woman but not a black woman?
Judge Wright, it bears mentioning, was intimately familiar with the
salience of race in American society. Indeed, one of the reasons that
Wright became a judge on the federal court of appeals in Washington,
D.C. was because his decisions supporting school desegregation as a district court judge in New Orleans, Louisiana brought unwanted attention
from hardcore defenders of Jim Crow.255 In 1969, four years after the
D.C. Circuit decided Williams, Judge Wright wrote an article for the New
York Times Magazine making it quite clear that he grasped the interwoven
252. Id. (quoting Williams, 198 A.2d at 916). In 2011 dollars, Williams’s stereo would
cost approximately $3650.
253. See, e.g., Julian S. Lim, Tongue-Tied in the Market: The Relevance of Contract
Law to Racial-Language Minorities, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 579, 594 (2003) (criticizing Judge
Wright’s opinion for unrecognizing race because “[i]t effectively extinguishes the
relevance of race, with the associated influences of racial perceptions and racist intents,
from contract-law discourse”); Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Disparity in
Discussions of Contract Law, 31 New Eng. L. Rev. 889, 929 (1997) (suggesting Court
should have recognized Williams’s race because it “may have contributed to the company’s
decision to tender the burdensome installment contract” (emphasis omitted)). But see
Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the
Courtroom, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 39 (1995) (lamenting inclusion of Williams in contract law
canon because doing so “equat[es] African-Americans with the ‘irresolute, feeble, or weak’
and impl[ies] that the condition of blackness creates a need for protection by the
paternalistic white power structure” (quoting Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A
Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & Econ. 293, 303 (1975))).
254. See Philip Elman, The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil
Rights Litigation, 1946–1960: An Oral History, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 817, 823 (1987) (“You
have to remember that in 1952 the District of Columbia was a southern city; it had separate
black and white school systems. Negroes were barred from eating in downtown restaurants.
The only places they could eat were in the black ghettos.”).
255. James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its
Troubled Legacy 107 (2001) (noting some local whites referred to J. Skelly Wright as
“Judas Wright” and as “a traitor to his class”).
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relationship between race and class. “The twin problems of racism and
poverty have converged in our society to become the problem of the inner city itself,” Wright began the article.256 Attuned as Wright was to the
issue of racial justice, it seems improbable that he simply neglected to
disclose Williams’s race either unthinkingly or out of a premature desire
to impose anticlassification norms. Instead, Judge Wright may have understood that recognizing Williams’s race would have invited courts to
cabin unconscionability’s doctrinal impact in an artificial manner.257
Judge Wright, in other words, may have concluded that recognizing
Williams’s race would have impeded rather than advanced the cause of
justice. And it would be difficult to fault him for doing so.
It is crucial, though, neither to boo Miranda’s racial recognition too
vigorously nor to cheer Williams’s racial unrecognition too lustily. A considerable amount of difficulty can arise when examining judicial practices
of recognizing race from bygone eras through modern spectacles. What
may have been appropriate at that time may be undesirable in the current racial climate. Contrary to some legal scholars’ dogged assertions,
racial conditions in America today differ dramatically from those that existed five decades ago when Chief Justice Warren wrote Miranda and
Judge Wright wrote Williams.258 It is this dynamic quality of racial conditions that makes it all the more urgent that courts going forward offer
explanations for recognizing race. Assessing older judicial decisions in
order to appreciate racial inversion is helpful, then, not primarily to condemn past court practices, but instead to illuminate the judicial future.
D. Anticlassification ≠ Colorblind
One technique that judges might increasingly employ in the future
when they wish to analyze racial considerations would capitalize upon a
potential distinction between the anticlassification principle, on the one
hand, and the colorblind principle, on the other. Many prominent legal
scholars portray these two concepts as being synonymous, even indistin256. J. Skelly Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, N.Y. Times Mag., Mar. 9,
1969, at 26.
257. Judges, it turned out, required no invitation at all to constrain contractual
unconscionability. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts,
and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 1290 (2003) (arguing for modifications to
unconscionability doctrine that would “result in greater social welfare . . . than the doctrine
as it is currently applied by courts”).
258. For a critique of legal scholars who are insufficiently sensitive to the racial
transformation that has occurred during recent decades, see Justin Driver, Rethinking the
Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 149, 171–73 (2011) (“Contending that the
existence of blacks today can be analogized to people who were literally (not
metaphorically) denied their freedom or to people who had their liberty thoroughly
circumscribed by Jim Crow minimizes the suffering of individuals who endured the yoke of
unrelenting racial oppression.”).
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guishable.259 Contrary to this received wisdom, however, the two notions
are conceptually distinct. Under the anticlassification principle, the government can be understood as forbidden from racially categorizing individuals.260 The colorblindness principle, in contrast, can be construed as
forbidding the government from taking account of racial considerations
among not only individuals, but within society as a whole.261 Colorblindness, thus, can sensibly be construed as a broader concept than anticlassification, and it circumscribes a broader range of government activity.
Although an advocate of colorblindness is necessarily an anticlassificationist, an anticlassificationist need not be colorblind.
Emphasizing the difference between these two concepts does not
amount to analytical fastidiousness. It is a difference that one can actually
detect in the real world of judicial opinion writing. Indeed, Supreme
Court Justices have, on occasion over the years, written opinions that do
not classify individuals according to race, but nevertheless acknowledge
the racial dynamics that exist in society. Accordingly, these opinions
abide by anticlassification norms, but also exercise a form of color consciousness. These opinions are, in other words, simultaneously
anticlassification and anticolorblind. Highlighting the distinction be259. See Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education—A Critical Introduction, in What
Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said: The Nation’s Top Legal Experts Rewrite
America’s Landmark Civil Rights Decision 3, 11 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (discussing what
he refers to as “the ‘anticlassification’ or ‘color-blindness’ principle”); id. (noting Justice
Harlan’s celebrated dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson “contains two distinct claims: first, that the
Constitution is opposed to the maintenance of racial caste, group subordination, or
second-class citizenship, and second, that the Constitution is colorblind and prohibits
racial classifications”); Gerken, supra note 219, at 119 (referring to “concern[ ] with the
injury associated with racial classifications” as “the colorblindness view”); Ian F. Haney
López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 Stan.
L. Rev. 985, 988 (2007) (“By reactionary colorblindness I mean an anticlassification
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause that accords race-conscious remedies and
racial subjugation the same level of constitutional hostility.”); Reva B. Siegel, From
Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality
Cases, 120 Yale L.J. 1278, 1281 (2011) (referring to “a colorblind anticlassification
principle”). The very first sentence of Professor Andrew Kull’s book—entitled The ColorBlind Constitution—goes a long way toward demonstrating how legal academia has tended
to merge anticlassification and colorblindness. See Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind
Constitution, at vii (1992) (“My object in this book is to discover the history of the
argument that the United States Constitution prohibits (or should prohibit) racial
classification by the agencies of government.”).
260. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1472 (2004) (noting
“anticlassification embodies the tradition’s fundamental value, the value of
individualism”); see also infra text accompanying notes 272–273 (discussing Justice
Kennedy’s views of dangers of racial classification).
261. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know It
Learned from the Warren Court, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 459, 479–80 (1997) (describing
aspiration for “colorblind society”). The term “color-blind,” of course, stretches back at
least as far as Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our Constitution is color-blind . . . .”).
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tween these two concepts could offer a valuable strategic move for advocates who wish the Court to continue—at least periodically—acknowledging the racial dimensions of particular legal problems.
Justice Stevens’s opinion partially dissenting from Illinois v. Wardlow
adopted an approach that avoided racially classifying the criminal defendant, but simultaneously avoided colorblindness. In that significant
Fourth Amendment case decided in 2000, the Court held that when Sam
Wardlow, a citizen in a high-crime neighborhood, ran away upon seeing
police officers, his flight provided the officers with reasonable suspicion.262 Although Wardlow’s brief declined to mention race, the NAACP
Legal Defense & Educational Fund’s amicus brief disclosed that he was “a
middle-aged African-American male.”263 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
straightforward opinion for the Court failed to address the case’s racial
dynamics. Although Justice Stevens did not classify Wardlow by race,
neither did he adopt the Court’s colorblind approach. Instead, Justice
Stevens addressed the larger question of how race should enter into the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness calculus. “Among some citizens,
particularly minorities and those residing in high crime areas, there is
also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but . . .
believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from
any criminal activity associated with the officer’s sudden presence,”
Justice Stevens explained.264 “For such a person, unprovoked flight is
neither ‘aberrant’ nor ‘abnormal.’”265
On some occasions, legal scholars who urge the Court to demonstrate greater racial awareness in its criminal procedure jurisprudence
criticize the Court for not revealing a party’s race.266 In this vein,
Professor Devon Carbado condemned the decision to omit the criminal
defendant’s race in Florida v. Bostick, where the Court found, within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, that a person traveling on an interstate bus should be assessed by a reasonable person’s “free to decline”
standard when police officers ask to inspect his belongings.267 The Court
262. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121, 125 (2000).
263. Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 2, Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (No. 98-1036), 1999 WL 606996.
264. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
265. Id. at 132–33.
266. See, e.g., Maclin, Black and Blue, supra note 25, at 265 (criticizing Court in
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)—a case considering police officer’s use of deadly
force—for “never mention[ing] that Garner was black”). In subsequent writings, Professor
Maclin has espoused a more robust view of the Court’s ideal approach to recognizing race.
Nevertheless, he has continued to portray racial classification as a foundational box to be
checked, before courts perhaps move on to contemplate a case’s broader racial
implications. See Maclin, Race, supra note 25, at 339–40 (“The majority opinion did not
even acknowledge that Edward Garner, who was shot in the back of the head by a Memphis
officer as he fled the scene of a burglary, was a skinny, unarmed black teenager.”).
267. 501 U.S. 429, 436–37 (1991). Professor Janice Nadler has cast doubt on whether
intercity bus passengers generally give consent voluntarily to police officers to search
during bus sweeps. See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology
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erred, Carbado suggested, in its “decision to see Bostick as a man and not
as a black man.”268
This phrasing may, however, improperly focus upon an exceedingly
circumscribed inquiry. Instead of emphasizing the narrower question of
whether the Court recognizes the race of a particular individual, it may
prove wiser to examine the broader question of whether the Court recognizes the racial dimension of a particular issue. Like the Court’s opinion
in Bostick, Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion in the case also refrained
from mentioning the criminal defendant’s race. But he nevertheless addressed the way in which police searches at bus depots—although purportedly random—likely have a disproportionate impact on racial minorities.269 Along these same lines, the amicus brief filed in Bostick by the
American Civil Liberties Union stated that “[i]nsofar as the facts of the
reported bus interdiction cases indicate, the defendants all appear to be
Black or Hispanic.”270 Assuming that this statement is true, had the
Court—in some statistically freakish event—decided to resolve the question presented in Bostick in the first-ever reported bus interdiction case
involving a white person, it would be no less pertinent for the Court to
contemplate the legal doctrine’s potential racial implications.
In other words, the party in a particular case need not be a racial
minority in order for judges to consider how a particular doctrine might
impact people who are racially subordinated. Resisting racial classifications could help to avoid such dilemmas. A particular legal problem may
have a significant racial dimension, even if the case on which the Court
grants certiorari does not involve a member of the racial group most comof Coercion, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153, 155 (observing empirical evidence suggests consent to
search is often not voluntarily given in bus sweep situation “because a reasonable person
would not be, under the totality of the circumstances, in a position to make a voluntary
decision about consent”).
268. Carbado, supra note 25, at 978; id. at 981 (criticizing Bostick for depicting
defendant and police officers “without explicit racial reference”); id. at 984–85 (“The
more fundamental problem with Justice O’Connor’s analysis is that it does not explicitly
engage race. Throughout her opinion, race remains unspeakable. A more careful analysis
would, at the very least, have racialized Bostick’s interaction with the officers.”). It seems
worth noting here that racial recognition can sometimes perform multiple meanings for
multiple audiences. Carbado wants Bostick to recognize race because he believes the racial
context is pertinent and that doing so will ultimately serve the cause of racial equality.
Some proponents of racial equality, however, could conceivably oppose racial recognition
in Bostick on the ground that it would be gratuitous, furthering the association of blacks
with drug dealing. In the context of racial recognition, thus, one person’s pertinence can
be another person’s gratuitousness.
269. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 441 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he approach of
passengers during a sweep [may not be] completely random. Indeed, at least one officer
who routinely confronts interstate travelers candidly admitted that race is a factor
influencing his decision whom to approach.”); id. at 450 n.4 (“Insisting that police officers
explain their decision to single out a particular passenger for questioning would help
prevent their reliance on impermissible criteria such as race.”).
270. Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18 n.19, Bostick,
501 U.S. 429 (No. 89-1717), 1990 WL 10013128.
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monly identified with that problem. On such occasions, the Court need
not turn a blind eye to that matter’s racial considerations. Instead, by
exploring race at a higher level of generality, the Court may acknowledge
the role that race plays. Far from being merely a law professor’s hypothetical, Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista—a case regarding a police officer’s power to arrest during a traffic
stop—raised the issue of racial profiling even though there was no indication in any materials before the Court that Gail Atwater was a racial
minority.271
A racial recognition approach that embraces anticlassification but simultaneously rejects colorblindness may hold particular attraction for the
person located at the center of many controversies before today’s Court:
Justice Anthony Kennedy. Justice Kennedy has repeatedly and passionately articulated the dangers he associates with the government determining an individual’s racial identity. Recently, however, Justice Kennedy has
also concluded that strict colorblindness sometimes affords decisionmakers too little flexibility to remedy racial problems. This technique
may thus enable Justice Kennedy to honor his commitments both to the
anticlassification ideal and to the race-conscious reality. Navigating the
narrow space between these two commitments could make a profound
difference in determining whether the Court issues decisions that appropriately acknowledge the role of race in society.
Justice Kennedy has written forcefully about the dangers of racial
classification. Indeed, eleven years ago in Rice v. Cayetano, Justice
Kennedy stated that the practice “demeans the dignity and worth of a
person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and
essential qualities.”272 And while Justice Kennedy has sometimes voiced
his aversion to racial considerations in a way that may seem somewhat
inclined toward colorblindness,273 he has never written an opinion unreservedly embracing that terminology. The absence of such an opinion
may be significant.
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion five years ago in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, regarding voluntary school integration programs, managed to be both anticlassification
and anticolorblindness.274 Kennedy undeniably expressed vehement op271. See 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[A]s the recent debate
over racial profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may
often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual.” (citing Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996))).
272. 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000); see Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of
Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 Yale L.J. 1694, 1736–45 (2008)
(contending dignity is one of Justice Kennedy’s core constitutional values).
273. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part) (“The moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the
Equal Protection Clause.”).
274. 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2788 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (calling classification “inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our
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position to having school districts classify students on the basis of race.
“Under our Constitution the individual, child or adult, can find his own
identity, can define her own persona, without state intervention that classifies on the basis of his race or the color of her skin,” Justice Kennedy
wrote.275 “To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society. And it is a label
that an individual is powerless to change.”276
But Justice Kennedy further made clear that he also rejected the notion that decisionmakers must never contemplate racial considerations.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy expressly disavowed Justice Harlan’s muchcelebrated line from the Plessy dissent contending: “Our Constitution is
color-blind . . . .”277 “[A]s an aspiration, Justice Harlan’s axiom must command our assent,” Justice Kennedy suggested. “In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle.”278
Justice Kennedy emphasized that school districts may take account of
race in several different ways without even drawing strict scrutiny from
the bench.279 School districts could, Kennedy explained, permissibly consider racial demographics in decisions regarding where to build new
schools and how to draw school attendance zones, among other contexts.280 Although Justice Kennedy certainly never phrased the thrust of
his Parents Involved argument in a vocabulary that acknowledged the distinction between anticlassification and colorblindness, that distinction
nevertheless seemed to animate the opinion implicitly. “If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain schools
interfere with the objective of offering an equal education opportunity to
all of their students,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “they are free to devise raceconscious measures to address the problem in a general way and without
treating each student in a different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.”281
Scholars and advocates who desire the Court to acknowledge racial
dynamics if they play an important role in particular doctrinal areas need
not agree with Justice Kennedy’s resolution of the dispute in Parents
society” while also claiming colorblindness “cannot be a universal constitutional
principle”).
275. Id. at 2797.
276. Id.
277. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For an
argument that the celebration of Harlan’s Plessy dissent has been wildly excessive, see Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (1991)
(“A color-blind interpretation of the Constitution legitimates, and thereby maintains, the
social, economic, and political advantages that whites hold over other Americans.”).
278. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
279. Id. at 2791–92.
280. Id. (identifying school siting decisions, drawing of school attendance zones,
targeted recruiting of students and faculty, and tracking of enrollment and performance
statistics by race as such measures).
281. Id.
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Involved. Indeed, I cast my own lot with many others who contend that
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Parents Involved offered a far more
persuasive vision of the Equal Protection Clause than those advanced in
the opinions written by Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justice Thomas.282 But allowing colorblindness to be conflated with anticlassification runs an unnecessarily high risk that the current Court will
ignore racial realities when it might otherwise grapple with them.
CONCLUSION
In 1926, Langston Hughes published what would become a renowned essay in The Nation called “The Negro Artist and the Racial
Mountain.”283 Black artists, Hughes insisted, should produce work that is
both rooted in and explorative of the black American experience.
Hughes memorably opened the essay by establishing as its foil an unnamed artist who aspires (foolishly, in Hughes’s estimation) to have his
work received in nonracial terms: “One of the most promising of the
young Negro poets said to me once, ‘I want to be a poet—not a Negro
poet.’”284
This freighted question of racial identity, as this Essay has demonstrated, is far from limited to black artists writing during the Harlem
Renaissance.285 Judges of all different races—whether they consciously
realize it or not—regularly confront strikingly similar questions of racial
identity. Writing eight decades after Hughes’s essay appeared, one legal
scholar criticized the Supreme Court for its decision imposing the nonracial frame that the young poet desired for himself, its decision—that is—
to portray a criminal defendant “as a man and not as a black man.”286
The young poet’s request haunts many of the opinions analyzed above,
ranging from Judge Posner’s portrayal of a rapist as “a respectably
dressed black man” rather than as “a respectably dressed man,”287 to
Justice Douglas’s labeling Louise Lassiter “a Negro citizen of North
Carolina” rather than “a citizen of North Carolina,”288 to Justice
282. See Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Forward: Demosprudence
Through Dissent, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 35–39 (2008) (extolling Justice Breyer’s oral and
written dissents); Goodwin Liu, The First Justice Harlan, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 1383, 1383
(2008) (referring to Justice Breyer’s dissent as “eloquent”); Owen Fiss, A Compelling Basis
for Integration, Louisville Courier-J., Sept. 16, 2007, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/
news/5617.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (praising Justice Breyer’s dissent as
one for the ages). I should disclose here that I served as a law clerk to Justice Breyer during
the Term when Parents Involved was decided.
283. Langston Hughes, The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain, The Nation, June
23, 1926, at 692.
284. Id.
285. For a compelling overview of this period, see David Levering Lewis, When
Harlem Was in Vogue (1981).
286. Carbado, supra note 25, at 978.
287. Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 851 (7th Cir. 1989).
288. Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 45 (1959).
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O’Connor’s depiction of a woman intimidated by a cross-burning as a
person “who was related to the owner of the property where the rally took
place” rather than “a white woman who was related to the owner of the
property where the rally took place.”289
That judges are making racial determinations regarding individuals
other than themselves, of course, adds a significant layer of complexity
that did not confront Hughes’s young poet. But it will no longer do to
allow that additional complexity to prevent us from analyzing judicial decisions to recognize race. Nor, however, will it do to insist broadly that
courts increase racial recognition without acknowledging the serious potential downsides that could accompany such recognition. The contemporary racial climate demands that courts approach racial matters with
nuance and reflection and—perhaps, above all—explanation. Judicial
recognitions of race evincing these three qualities have not been much in
evidence, even in the recent past. Embracing these qualities, however, is
essential to charting the racial path ahead.

289. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 348 (2003).
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